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THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON LABOR
LAW: SOME AMERICAN COMPARISONS
MARLEY S. WEISS*
As the western European nations transform themselves into a single
market and then a European Union, a comparative examination of Euro-
pean Community and American labor law developments is both valuable
and timely. The European Economic Community is in the midst of a
major reorganization and expansion of its spheres of competency and its
institutional arrangements, including highly significant changes regard-
ing labor-management relations. American labor relations law, too, may
be on the verge of important change, although the dimensions and scope
of the change are, at this point, difficult to discern.
The European Community, scheduled to complete its development
from a customs union into a single market by the end of 1992, has now
undertaken as well to become a political and economic union. European
Union means movement to a single European currency, European citi-
zenship, increased coordination of common defense and foreign policies,
and bolstering the democratic accountability of the European Commu-
nity's political institutions.' More significant for our purposes, European
Union means an expanded European Community competence over mat-
ters of "social policy," 2 a term encompassing what Americans refer to as
labor law, as well as other matters of social welfare policy. 3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A. 1971, Barnard
College; J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Pam Connally, John McIn-
tire, and Jon Newman for their able research assistance on this project, and to express her gratitude
to Maria Makris-Gouvas and Ted Tomlinson, for their insightful suggestions about the manuscript.
1. A useful summary of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the changes it
will effect in the institutional, economic, and legal structure of the European Community may be
found in PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: FROM COMMON MARKET TO EURO-
PEAN UNITY 295-304 (Patrick Del Duca trans., 1992). On the broad implications of the Community
becoming a European Union, see generally Peter Ludlow, The Maastricht Treaty and the Future of
Europe, 15 WASH. Q. 119 (1992).
2. The expanded social competence largely exempts the U.K., however. See Protocol on So-
cial Policy annexed to Treaty on European Union, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 357-58 (1992) [hereinafter
Protocol on Social Policy]; Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States of
the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland annexed to Protocol on Social Policy annexed to Treaty on European Union, reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 358-60 (1992) [hereinafter Agreement on Social Policy]. See generally ROGER BLANPAIN,
LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION: MAASTRICHT AND BE-
YOND: FROM A COMMUNITY TO A UNION 31-33 (1992).
3. Title III of the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, [EEC
TREATY] (as amended 1987), entitled "Social Policy," includes a Social Provisions chapter with
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The pace of these developments may seem glacial to some Europe-
ans, but from the American perspective, they seem fairly breathtaking.
Even the name of the Community has been rendered partially obsolete.
Upon ratification of the Treaty on European Union, agreed upon at
Maastricht by the twelve Member States on December 10, 1991, and
signed February 7, 1992, the European Economic Community, or
"EEC," is transformed into a European Union to be known as the Euro-
pean Community, the "EC. ' '4 As of this writing, ten Member States-all
but the UK and Denmark-have ratified the Maastricht Treaty. 5
The transformation from an economic to a political and social union
is by no means assured, however. The Danish refusal to ratify the Maas-
tricht Treaty without substantive change6 is symptomatic of growing
concerns among the citizens in several EC countries regarding the "dem-
ocratic deficit"-the limited electoral accountability of most organs of
government in the EC structure.7 Because the Danish objections involve
issues such as the single currency and foreign and defense policy 8-mat-
articles bearing on employment (art. 118); labor-management relations and collective bargaining
(arts. 118, 118B); working conditions (arts. 117, 118); vocational training (art. 118); social security
(arts. 118, 121); occupational safety and health (arts. 118, 118A); labor law (art. 118); workers' right
of association for purposes of mutual aid and protection, including union organizing (art. 118); equal
remuneration for equal work by men and women (art. 119); and governmentally-mandated paid
holiday schemes (art. 120). In addition, the Social Policy Title includes a chapter establishing the
European Social Fund, to encourage and fund vocational retraining as well as to provide interim
assistance and resettlement allowances for workers displaced by business restructurings and rede-
ployment of operations. EEC TREATY, supra, arts. 117-21.
4. Treaty on European Union, art. G, intro. para., A(l) (amending EEC TREATY, supra note
3, art. 1) [hereinafter EC Treaty or Maastricht Treaty]. See MENGOZZI, supra note I, at 295, 297.
The twelve Member States are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EEC TREATY, supra note 3,
art. 227.
5. See European Union: Netherlands and Germany Ratify Maastricht, EUR. REP., INSTS. &
POL'Y COORDINATION, Dec. 19, 1992, No. 1822.
6. See Result of the Danish Referendum on the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, BULL.
E.C. 6-1992, pts. 1.1.1-1.1.4.
7. The democratic deficit, problems with proposed solutions within the EC's institutional
framework, and Maastricht Treaty developments that bear on these matters, are discussed in Lud-
low, supra note 1, at 127-29, 136. The need for institutional change, including decreasing Member
State sovereignty in favor of increased direct EC citizen representation, via the European Parlia-
ment, in EC lawmaking, is fueling a renewed debate over "deepening versus broadening" the Com-
munity. This dispute may yet derail the proposed accession of three or four additional members to
the Community if the European Parliament refuses to give the required parliamentary assent to the
accession treaties. See European Union: Reforms to EC Institutions Ahead of Enlargement, EUR.
REP. INSTS. & POL'Y COORDINATION, Jan. 27, 1993, No. 1830. On the need for EC institutional
restructuring, and for democratic deepening to accompany widening of the Community through
entry of additional Member States, see Commission of the European Communities, Europe and the
Challenge of Enlargement, BULL. E.C., Supp. 3/92.
8. The agreement reached to secure a second Danish ratification vote on the Maastricht
Treaty permitted the Danes to opt out of the treaty provisions regarding economic and monetary
union, citizenship in the European Union, common defense, and immigration. See European Coun-
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ters apart from social policy9-it is probable that the Maastricht Treaty
will eventually come into effect without modification to any of its provi-
sions concerning labor law.10
On December 11, 1992, the European Council, meeting in Edin-
burgh, reached agreement on an arrangement, in the form of a European
Council "Decision" permitting Denmark to opt out of EC Treaty provi-
sions regarding common European defense (Section C), economic and
monetary union (Section B), justice and immigration (Section D), and
the concept of EC citizenship (Section A). In addition, the European
cil, Edinburgh (Dec. 11-12, 1992), EUR. INSIGHT, Dec. 18, 1992, No. 0549 [hereinafter European
Council].
9. The Danes are also concerned about EC involvement in social policy, but only for fear that
existing Danish national standards might be lowered by EC action. Because the Danes regard the
Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, as a vehicle to harmonize social standards upward
throughout the Community, Denmark has supported that aspect of Maastricht. Denmark sought
and obtained, as part of the Edinburgh package, a European Council Declaration which permits it to
maintain or adopt national standards stricter than those set by the EC on matters of social policy,
consumer protection, and the environment. See European Council, supra note 8.
10. The Council statement asserted that these arrangements are "fully compatible with the
Treaty .... and ... apply exclusively to Denmark and not to other existing or acceding Member
States .... Key Points of EC Summit Agreement on Denmark, REUTER LIBR. REP., Dec. 12, 1992
[hereinafter Key Points of EC Summit]. Predictably, observers have reached diametrically differing
views about whether the Danes won a significant exemption from the EC Treaty, nothing they did
not already have, or something in between.
In the run-up to Edinburgh, many legal experts were predicting that the drafters in the
Foreign Affairs Office had set themselves a mission impossible. Either they made real
changes to the Treaty, in which case it would need re-ratification (which had been ruled
out); or else they made no real changes, in which case Denmark would not be satisfied. In
the event, the drafters have worked a miracle. They have made no real changes, while
persuading Denmark that it has been granted a whole series of new "opt-outs." As one
spokesman for the anti-Maastricht "June" movement in Copenhagen put it . . . "Hans
Christian Andersen would be amused. The Emperor has a new set of clothes."
Noel Malcolm, Danish Opt-Out a Clever Illusion; Noel Malcolm Believes Denmark Has Gained Noth-
ing from Its Stand Against Maastricht, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 20, 1992, at 16. Compare, e.g.,
Edward Mortimer, Foreign Affairs: Same Deal as Before-The Danes Did Not Win New Concessions
on Maastricht, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at 18 ("In short, all that happened in Edinburgh was that
Denmark's rights under the treaty were spelt out.") with, e.g., Lionel Barber, The Maastricht Jour-
ney Resumes: The Edinburgh Summit's Successful Conclusion Has Put the Community Back on the
Track, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1992, at 16 ("Given the legal acrobatics involved in finding a solution,
EC leaders strove to convince observers that they had made the Danes sweat. Yet the outcome left
Denmark with all of its substantive demands intact.").
The agreement took the form of a European Council Decision, rather than a Declaration, to
satisfy the Danish insistence that their exemptions from the EC Treaty be legally binding, to support
their holding a second ratification vote. At the same time, the use of a "Decision" met the demands
of Germany and other states that no revision or re-ratification of the Maastricht Treaty be required.
As a Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting in the framework of the European
Council, the Decision is an international treaty, legally binding between Member States, but not a
part of EC treaty-based law; hence, conferring no jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice and
no enforceable rights on individual EC nationals. It is thus claimed that the Decision is binding
under international law, but not a part of EC law. European Council, supra note 8. See also Lionel
Barber & Hilary Barnes, The Edinburgh Summit: Legalistic Acrobatics Rescue Denmark-Maas-
tricht, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 2; Ian Davidson, The Edinburgh Summit: Treaty May Leak
Through Loopholes-Maastricht Doubts Have Not Been Resolved, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 3.
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Council entered into a declaration assuring Denmark that it remains free
to maintain or adopt environmental and social policy measures more
protective of its citizens than those required under EC laws." I Leaders of
other EC Member States have expressed their expectation that ratifica-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty will now proceed expeditiously in both
Denmark and the U.K., and have threatened, if necessary, to create a
European Union on Maastricht-like lines without either of the laggards,
if need be.12
In addition, the resolution of the social policy agenda at Maastricht
was accomplished in a highly unusual fashion. The main Maastricht
Treaty, creating the European Union, the single currency, and the in-
creased coordination of common defense and foreign affairs, was entered
into by all twelve current Member States of the EEC.' 3 The text of the
Maastricht Treaty operates to amend the original 1957 Treaty of Rome,
as amended, inter alia, by the 1986 Single European Act' 4. Effectively,
these treaties operate as a constitution or articles of confederation, creat-
ing the EC institutional superstructure and governing its relations with
the Member States and their citizens.15
To amend the treaties required the concurrence of all twelve mem-
ber states. 16 The United Kingdom, however, consonant with its general
hostility toward increased EC centralization and federation, adamantly
insisted on preserving greater state sovereignty. At Maastricht, the U.K.
resisted efforts to create a single EC currency as well as attempts to de-
velop a more unified social policy.' 7
Consequently, the U.K. made itself the odd-man out regarding so-
cial policy. When no agreement could be reached among the twelve
states as to social provisions, the remaining eleven Member States en-
tered into the Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Mem-
11. Key Points of EC Summit, supra note 10.
12. See, eg., Kohl Expects Britain, Denmark to Ratify Maastricht, REUTER LIBR. REP., Jan. 26,
1993.
13. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 227.
14. Id. art. G, intro. para.
15. Opinion on the Draft Agreement Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area
(EEA) (op. 1/91) [1992] (CEC(CCH)) 184, 200-01 [hereinafter Opinion on EEA], discussed in
MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at 260-62 (the EEC Treaty is the "Constitutional Charter" and has "cre-
ated a new legal system for the benefit of which the Member States have limited their sovereign
rights within even broader fields, and the subjects of which are not only Member States but also their
nationals."). See also Case 294/83, Les Verts, Partie Ecologiste v. European Parliament, 1986
E.C.R. 1339, 2 C.M.L.R. 343 (1987).
16. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 236 (amendments to be adopted by "common accord"
among the representatives of the Member States, and to enter into force "after being ratified by all
the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." See
MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at 49-50.
17. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras. 1, 5, 6, 69.
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ber States of the European Community With the Exception of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.I, The Agreement on
Social Policy was attached to the EC Treaty by annexation to a Protocol
on Social Policy, which was in turn annexed to the Treaty establishing
the European Community. 19 The Protocol, like the Treaty, and unlike
the Agreement on Social Policy, was entered into by all twelve Member
States.20 Under the terms of the Protocol, all of the normal EC legisla-
tive processes will apply to social legislation enacted pursuant to the So-
cial Agreement, except that the U.K. will not be bound by law so
created, and the U.K. minister will not participate in the deliberations
and voting of the Council of Ministers, 2' whose final approval is neces-
sary before binding acts, including regulations, directives and decisions,
are enacted under EC Treaty procedures. 22
Consequently, the Maastricht Social Agreement, which expands the
labor law subject matter on which EC legislation is appropriate, 23 and
which relaxes the voting requirements for enactment of such legisla-
tion,24 is only partially determinative of the course of proposals for labor-
related legal provisions. First, Maastricht has not yet been fully ratified,
and possibly will never go into effect. Second, even if the Maastricht
Treaty ultimately comes into force, the desire to maintain one homogene-
ous body of EC law will militate in favor of efforts to obtain U.K. con-
currence, proceeding through the EC organs applicable without regard to
the Maastricht Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy. 25 Particularly
as regards prospects for future developments, any discussion of EC labor
18. Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, intro. para.; Agreement on Social Policy, supra
note 2, intro. para. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras. 1, 69, 160.
19. Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, intro. para.
20. Id. intro. para. ("The High Contracting Parties" enter into the Protocol, signifying assent
by all twelve member states.); see BLAINPAIN, supra note 2, para. 68.
21. Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, paras. 1, 2; see BLANPAIN, supra at 2, para. 69.
There is some doubt about the constitutionality of this peculiar process of appending to the law and
institutions of the full community a body of law and lawmaking procedures applicable only to eleven
of the twelve members. See id. para. 13.
22. EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 148, 189, 189a, 189b, 189c. See generally MENGOZZI, supra
note 1, at 25-28. It is possible for the Commission to issue "secondary" regulations, but only on
matters delegated by the Council. See id. at 89.
23. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2, paras.1, 3; BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras.
2, 70-72, 160.
24. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 2 (specifying qualified majority vot-
ing on activities in fields identified in art. 2, para. 1); Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, para. 2
(eliminating U.K. from unanimous voting under the Agreement on Social Policy, and eliminating
the U.K's weighted votes from qualified majority yoting, leading to a forty-four vote minimum in
lieu of the usual fifty-four).
25. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 160. Britain, in turn, will be under pressure to compro-
mise, rather than to drive the eleven to proceed under the Agreement on Social Policy, lest the U.K.
play no moderating role in developing a body of labor law to which it is likely, eventually, to have to
subscribe. See id. paras. 6, 160.
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law must accordingly take account of both the Treaty rules and the rules
created under the Agreement on Social Policy. 26
The importance of European Community law goes beyond the
eleven or twelve participating EC Member States. In 1991, the Commu-
nity concluded important treaties with European countries outside the
EC itself. The European Economic Area Treaty (EEA) covers the seven
non-EC, western European, industrialized countries, who are present or
proposed members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA): Austria,
Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.27 A sec-
ond set of treaties, the Europe Agreements, created a status of "associ-
ate" European Community membership for Hungary, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. 28
In a different way, each of these treaties creates a half-way house to
full membership status in the EC for these other European countries.
They are within the free trade area for many purposes, but are subject,
without EC-membership voting rights, to the existing body of treaty-
based law, including regulations and directives governing social policy as
well as the single market. 29 Future EC actions affecting labor law, at
26. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 7. European commentators characterize this situation
as creating a "two-track social Europe." See, e.g., id. paras. 6, 160.
27. Agreement Establishing the European Economic Area, BULL. E. C. 5-1992, pt. 1.2.1. A
previous draft of the EEA agreement is described in the opinion of the European Court of Justice
holding the judicial provisions of the draft incompatible with the existing EEC Treaty. See Opinion
on EEA, supra note 15, at 186-98.
28. Association Agreement Between the Community and Hungary, Dec. 16, 1991, BULL. E.C.
12-1991, pt. 1.3.2; European Parliament's Assent thereto, OJC 284, Nov. 2, 1992, BULL. E.C. 9-1992,
pt. 1.3.11; Association Agreement Between the Community and Poland, Dec. 16, 1991, BULL. E.C.
12-1991, pt. 1.3.2.; European Parliament's Assent thereto, OJC 284, Nov. 2, 1992, BULL. E.C. 9-
1992, pt. 1.3.11; Association Agreement with Czechoslovakia, BULL. E.C. 12-1991, pt. 1.3.2. Trade
provisions of this agreement were provisionally implemented by an interim agreement, and have
remained in force. However, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into two independent states has
placed implementation of the Association Agreement in doubt and has entailed further negotiations.
See BULL. E.C. 9-1992, pt. 1.3.14. The European Agreements with Hungary, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia, are described more fully in JOHN PINDER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN
EUROPE 59-72 (1991).
29. An "Association Agreement" is concluded with the EC pursuant to EEC TREATY, art. 238,
to establish "an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special
procedures." EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 238. Nonmember European States customarily enter
into an association arrangement, creating common institutional structures such as a jointly consti-
tuted council and consultative assembly in preparation for subsequently negotiating an accession
agreement and fully joining the community. See MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at 252-53; PINDER, supra
note 28, at 63-64, 70-72. The EEA Agreement would have extended to the EFTA countries the
EEC's body of community law regarding the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital,
as well as regarding competition, including the substance of pertinent EEC Treaty provisions, bind-
ing legislative enactments implementing those provisions, and related judicial interpretations predat-
ing the signing of the EEA Treaty. The EEC Court of Justice, however, reviewed a July, 1991 draft
of the treaty, and found its provisions for judicial review by a newly-created EEA Court, and appli-
cation to EFTA states of EC law incompatible with the EEC Treaty. Opinion on EEA, supra note
15, at 186-98. See MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at 253, 259-62; see also PINDER, supra note 28, at 63-64
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least if taken pursuant to the EC Treaty rather than under the Agree-
ment on Social Policy, may also affect the law not only of the EC Mem-
ber States but of nearly all of western and central Europe.30
Even where labor law developments within the EC are not binding
on these countries, nearly all aspire to eventual full EC membership,
hence are likely to voluntarily emulate EC labor standards much the way
Sweden was handling its currency as though it were subject to the EC's
monetary convergence program. 3' The EC has now opened negotiations
for accession agreements with three EFTA countries, Austria, Finland,
and Sweden.32 The expressed aspirations of Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic to attain full EC membership as soon as possible, have
been acknowledged by the Community. 33 The movement from state so-
cialism toward free markets in the former Soviet-block countries height-
ens the geopolitical, as well as economic significance of the new EC
treaties. In addition, of course, globalized trade and nearly instantaneous
international communications mean that legal and economic develop-
ments in the European Community have rapid, strong effects on the re-
mainder of the world, and particularly on the United States.
(discussing difficulties of creating and then applying new EC law to EEA and Europe Agreement
countries which are not represented in EC institutions and are not bound by European Court of
Justice decisions). A revised EEA Agreement was thereafter entered into on May 2, 1992. See
BULL. E.C 5-1992, pt. 1.2.1. It has been estimated that the EEA agreement extended two-thirds of
the body of EC law to the EFTA countries. See Janet McEvoy, Arctic Farms, Neutrality Key to EC
Membership Talks, REUTER LIBR. REP., Jan. 28, 1993. Switzerland, however, failed to ratify the
amended treaty, throwing its status into doubt. Id. The remaining EFTA countries, together with
the EC, nevertheless intend to go ahead with implementation of the EEA Treaty, which, unlike
Maastricht, made provisions against the contingency of non-ratification by an EFTA member coun-
try. The remaining six EEA/EFTA member states have ratified the treaty. See European Commu-
nity: Maastricht Treaty, Single Market Concerns, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 148. (Jan. 27,
1993).
30. As to the EEA, see Opinion on EEA, supra note 15, at 193-94, 198-99. The difficulties in
applying future as well as pre-existing EC caselaw to association agreement partners, even where the
association agreements intentionally incorporate treaty language identical to that of the EEC Treaty,
are discussed id. at 200-02.
31. See Vibeke Laroi, Swedish Social Democrats Avoid Issue of Joining EC, REUTER LIBR.
REP., Jan. 19, 1993.
32. Negotiations opened on February 2, 1993, with a goal of accession by January 1, 1995. See
ECAspirants Agree Agenda, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1993, at 2. These three applicants for membership
have reiterated unequivocal commitment to all aspects of the EC Treaty, including common Euro-
pean foreign and defense policy, as well as social policy and the single market. See David Gardner,
New Applicants to Give Up the Neutrality Habit, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at 2. Norway is expected
to join negotiations for accession later in 1993. See Christopher Follett, Danish Premier Sees Maas-
tricht "Yes" as Top Priority, REUTER LIBR. REP., Feb. 2, 1993.
33. See Andrew Marshall & Sarah Lambert, The Edinburgh Summit: What the leaders of Eu-
rope agreed, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 14, 1992, at 10 ("The summiteers agreed that at the Copen-
hagen Summit in June they will set out a path for membership of the EC for eastern Europe .. ");
Barber, supra note 10 ("Late on Friday night, Chancellor Kohl spoke expansively of a Community
stretching eastwards to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Federation, and the Baltic
states .... "). See also Pinder, supra note 28, at 1, 71-72.
1993]
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These same factors, however, render a discussion of the impact of
the European Community on labor law ambiguous and uncertain. First,
when one speaks of the "impact of the EEC on labor law," there is the
question of impact on whose labor law-that of European Community
countries, other European countries, the United States, or other non-Eu-
ropean countries. Second, one may ask what sorts of impact we are con-
cerned with, or how the impact comes about. The topic might be
confined to the impact of European Community labor law on labor law
at the national level, or it might encompass the impact of the creation of
a single economic market and other dimensions of European unification
on labor law. These ambiguities are compounded by the unsettled status
of European Community law generally, in light of questions about the
ultimate ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the many uncertainties
regarding labor law if the Treaty becomes operative.
In this commentary, I will concentrate on drawing some compari-
sons between European developments and analogous problems affecting
U.S. labor relations. The most important impact of the EC on American
labor law may well be through the trans-Atlantic influence of concepts,
models and structures pioneered in Europe. This commentary will iden-
tify and sketch out relevant comparisons, although more detailed devel-
opment must be left for another day and time.34
One may profitably compare developments in the European Com-
munity with those in the United States in two different ways. First, one
may regard the EC as a confederal system, moving toward a loose form
of political union, and one may compare the interaction of EC level and
community-member national level developments with the interaction of
U.S. federal level and state level labor developments. Alternatively, one
may think of the EC as predominantly an economic and customs union,
and one expanding to include EFTA countries as well as several central
European states. One may then draw comparisons to the common mar-
ket proposed under the North American Free Trade Agreement among
Canada, Mexico and the U.S., and its potential extension, through the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, throughout the Western
Hemisphere.
The comparison between European Community-Member State rela-
tions on the one hand, and U.S. federal-state relations on the other, must
34. The usual admonitions apply regarding the inevitable partiality and distortion entailed in a
comparative analysis without more contextual detail than is possible here about the institutional,
social and political settings in which these legal rules are embedded. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers,
Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Per-
spective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 367 (1980).
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be taken with some caution. The European Community is closer to a
confederation of nation-states than it is to becoming a unified federation.
The EC starts from a base of well-developed national legal systems. In
many areas of its competence, the EC does not exclusively occupy the
field, but, rather, through harmonization of Member State laws, attempts
to move the national systems towards convergence, or at least to avoid
economically harmful clashes of state legal cultures. 35 Indeed, the most
prevalent type of legal instrument created pursuant to the EEC Treaty is
the directive. This instrument functionally reflects the EC's desire in
many circumstances to "approximate" the laws of the Member States,
reducing the policy differences while permitting the states to retain their
diverse legal traditions by implementing EC policies in varying ways. 36
The formal incorporation into the Maastricht Treaty of the principle
of subsidiarity, can only reinforce the tendency to retain predominance of
Member State legislation over EC action. "Subsidiarity" means that in
areas subject to legislation at both the national and EC level, the EC
should take action only when, and to the extent that, "by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, [it] can be better achieved by the
Community," and only to the extent "necessary to achieve the objectives
of [the] Treaty." 37
It is worthwhile to contrast U.S. and EC approaches to the persis-
tent debate on both continents over whether to enact labor legislation at
the state or federal level. To produce uniformity of law, the EC may
enact a "regulation," a generally and directly applicable legal instrument
akin to a U.S. federal statute, binding in its entirety on all Member States
and their citizens, preemptive of conflicting Member States' laws, and
enforceable by, inter alia, Member States and their citizens against each
other.38 Virtually nothing in the labor or social policy field has been
enacted in this way, however, and this is likely to persist for the foresee-
able future. Indeed, the EC Treaty does not authorize adoption of regu-
lations, but only directives, regarding most issues of social policy.
35. See MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at 52-53.
36. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 100 (providing procedures for issuance of directives for
approximation of Member States' laws that "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the
common market"); id. art. 100a(l) (providing procedures for issuance of directives for approxima-
tion of Member States' laws "which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market"). Directives are the legal instrument of choice for "approximation" of Member
States' laws. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74.
37. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 3b.
38. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 189. EC and Member State caselaw interpreting the
Treaty to ensure that regulations and the European Court of Justice caselaw interpreting them are
indeed fully binding and directly enforceable in Member States is discussed in MENGOZZl, supra
note 1, at 52-53, 76, 86-90.
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Except for directives regarding occupational health and safety under Ar-
ticle 118a, Article 100a, Section 2 of the EC Treaty requires that "provi-
sions relating to the rights and interests of employed persons" may only
be adopted by unanimous vote of the Council.3 9 Only by proceeding
under the Agreement on Social Policy may the Council adopt social leg-
islation concerning matters other than occupational health by qualified
majority voting, and even then, only through directives setting minimum
standards which the Member States remain free to exceed. 40
To the extent that there is an exception here, it is in the area of
rights regarding nondiscrimination on the basis of Member State nation-
ality, and in the limited sphere of equal pay, on the basis of sex. These
rights are spelled out in the text of the EC Treaty,4' and have been held
to be directly enforceable by citizens against each other ("horizontal di-
rect effect") as well as against state action ("vertical direct effect"). 42 In
39. With a few exceptions, directives are the strongest form of action authorized in the social
policy area under the EEC Treaty, whose social policy provisions were virtually unaffected by Maas-
tricht. In most instances, social policy directives must be adopted by unanimous vote. In many
areas, only nonbinding action may be taken by the EC. In several articles the treaty calls for purely
voluntaristic efforts, such as the obligation of the Commission to "promot[e] close cooperation be-
tween the Member States in the social field," by conducting studies, consulting with the Economic
and Social Council, and delivering [nonbinding] opinions. Article 117 provides that "harmonization
of social systems" will "ensue ... from the functioning of the common market;" improved living
standards and working conditions for workers will also flow from "approximation of provisions" of
Member State law. Article 118b exhorts the Commission to "endeavour to develop the social dia-
logue between labor and management." Article 120 requires Member States to "endeavour" to
maintain equivalence between their paid holiday schemes. The exceptions are Article 118a, under
which health and safety directives may be adopted by qualified majority voting, see infra text accom-
panying notes 84, 86, 97-98, 169, Article 121, relating to social security for migrant workers exercis-
ing their rights to migrate and be free of nationality-based discrimination under Articles 7 and 48-5 1,
which permits adoption of regulations as well as directives to ensure removal of barriers to free
movement of workers, infra text accompanying notes 60, 81, 85, 101-02, and Article 119, the equal
pay for men and women provision, to the extent that it is directly applicable. Nondiscrimination on
the basis of nationality, and in matters of pay, on the basis of sex, are discussed immediately infra
text accompanying notes 41-43, 82-83, 92-96.
40. The Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, contemplates fulfillment of its stated objec-
tives only through directives, see art. 2, para. 2, or through agreements between management and
labor, see art. 4, para. 2 (substituting council adoption of social partner agreements for the usual
processes of enacting directives); id. art. 2, para. 2, art. 4, para. 2 (implementing directives or substi-
tuted collective agreements through national labor-management practices and procedures). The
EEC treaty, whose social policy provisions were virtually unaffected by Maastricht, calls for direc-
tives as the legal instrument for fulfillment of treaty policies, or for more voluntaristic efforts, such as
the obligation of the Commission to "promot[e] close cooperation between the Member States in the
social field," by conducting studies, consulting with the Economic and Social Council, and delivering
"nonbinding" opinions (art. 118).
41. Article 7 (nationality); art. 119 (gender). Article 7 is often construed together with the
rights of "free movement of workers" under arts. 48-5 1, "freedom of establishment" under arts. 52-
58, and "freedom to provide services" under arts. 59-66. See generally MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at
238-39; ROGER BLANPAIN, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY paras. 127-98, 218-54 (1991).
42. See e.g., Case 188/89, A Foster & Others v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. 3313, 2 C.M.L.R. 833
(1990); Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Tresor Public, 1989 E.C.R. 195, 2 C.M.L.R. 613 (1989)
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addition, the proscription against nationality discrimination is enforcea-
ble by regulation as well as by directive, and a regulation has been
adopted on the subject.43 Such "constitutionally" based equal treatment
claims, therefore, create a fairly uniform body of substantive law applica-
ble to all workers throughout the EC.
One may contrast this with strong policy interests favoring uniform-
ity of both substance and procedure, evident throughout much of Ameri-
can labor law, particularly that regarding collective bargaining. Strong
labor law preemption doctrines operate to oust the states from the field
and reserve exclusive jurisdiction for the National Labor Relations Board
regarding union organizing,4 the use of economic weaponry in labor dis-
putes,4 5 and unfair labor practices related to collective bargaining and
the administration of the resultant collective agreement. 46
With the exception of statutes and common law doctrines establish-
ing legal standards for all employment, American states are also ousted
from creating substantive law applicable to collective bargaining agree-
ments, 47 and by and large are ousted of judicial jurisdiction over contract
enforcement in favor of labor arbitration and federal court enforce-
ment. 48 For historical reasons, the states played little role in collective
(disparate treatment on the basis of EC nationality); Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R.
455, 2 C.M.L.R. 98 (1976) (Defrenne II) (equal pay for men and women). See generally SACHA
PRECHAL & NOREEN BURROWS, GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 27-30 (1990). The European Community term for this is "horizontal direct enforceability," to
distinguish such rights from those enforceable only against governmental action, but not by private
actors against other private actors, which are vertically, but not horizontally enforceable. See gener-
ally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at 136; PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra, at 29-30.
43. Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L257) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 2434/
92, 1992 O.J. (L245) 1 and Council Regulation 312/76, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 2.
44. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See generally 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1660-67 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
45. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132 (1976); see also Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989). See
generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1673-78.
46. Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986). See
also Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245-47. See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at
1667-73.
47. Claims asserting rights based upon or dependent upon interpretation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement must be interpreted in accordance with the federal common law of the labor agree-
ment, whether litigation takes place in state or federal court. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202 (1985); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); see also
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1698-1706.
48. When the collective bargaining agreement provides for binding labor arbitration as the
method of dispute resolution, courts must compel arbitration without considering the merits of the
grievance, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and, provided the award "draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement," must enforce the resulting arbitration award without
second-guessing the judgment of the arbitrator. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
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labor relations before the NLRA.49 Now, their role is almost entirely
confined to state and local public sector labor law.
In Europe, quite the reverse is true. Collective bargaining, and
other forms of worker representation and participation which accomplish
functions handled in the U.S. through collective bargaining or not at all,
developed through indigenous, diverse industrial relations systems in
each of the twelve EC Member countries.50 The attainment of EC-wide
uniformity of labor relations systems, through EC regulation, is not even
a long range objective; harmonization through more flexible mechanisms
has proven an elusive goal, except in the narrow but important category
of issues related to capital redeployment.5"
Even where there is no collective bargaining, in an important second
area of U.S. workplace governance, relations are effectively collectivized:
the area of employee benefits. The very nature of funded or insured ben-
efit plans, even where terms are unilaterally set by the employer, requires
that they be uniform across masses of workers, and precludes most indi-
vidual negotiation. In the United States, the federal Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) 52 regulates all types of private
sector, employer-sponsored fringe benefits programs, 53 and with a limited
29, 36 (1987). While, in theory, federal and state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over suits
interpreting collective bargaining agreements under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), suits filed in
state court are removable to federal court, see IBEW v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855-59 (1987). Fed-
eral courts therefore handle the lion's share of these cases.
49. William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1113-14 (1989); see generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMER-
ICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
50. The nature and extent of diversity among European Community Member States is deline-
ated in BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at 64-68; BLANPAIN, supra note 2, at 57.
51. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at 67-68, 153-96, 204-05. While the Agreement on
Social Policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty would ease the barriers to labor legislation as to the
eleven party Member States, it contemplates adoption only of directives, rather than regulations. It
also requires that the directives "hav[e] regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each
of the Member States," Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2 para. 2, and that these
measures must "take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of
contractual relations .. " Id. art. 1. The most likely vehicle for creation of uniform EC-wide rules
regarding any aspect of labor-management relations is the possibility of an EC level collective agree-
ment pursuant to Article 4 of the Agreement on Social Policy. See infra text accompanying notes
192-93.
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
53. Section 3 of ERISA defines "employee welfare benefit plan" as follows:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan,
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A)
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training
programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any
benefit described in Section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 USC
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exception for state regulation of insurance policies, completely preempts
all forms, direct and indirect, of state regulation.5 4 Here, as with respect
to collective bargaining, uniform federal law is viewed as essential not
only to eliminate competition between states, but also to minimize the
regulatory burden on multi-state employers, operating in up to fifty
states, and to permit the employers, unilaterally or through collective
bargaining, to develop identical national employment policies and em-
ployee benefits policies, applicable to their employees without regard to
the state location of the operation."5
In EC countries, many more forms of social insurance are provided
by the government rather than workers' employers.56 In addition, where
the employer provides benefits, they are often supplemental to, and inte-
grated with, the national social insurance scheme. 57  Again, this has
made it difficult for the EC to find consensus on even minimum stan-
dards for benefits, and thoroughly precludes any uniform EC-level
scheme any time soon.58 Only in the area of equal treatment for men and
women have directives been issued, and even there the progress has been
§ 186(c)] (other than pensions on retirement or death; and insurance to provide such
pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). In turn, § 101 of ERISA regulates reporting and disclosure regarding
all employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
54. E.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). Section 514(a) of ERISA provides,
in part, that provisions of ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
and hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ...." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
55. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 104-06 (1983) (quoting legislative
history). Congress wished to "ensur[e] that employers would not face 'conflicting or inconsistent
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.'" Id. at 104, quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,933
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
56. Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 1408/71, 1971 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 149) 2, regarding mul-
tistate social security claims, applies to legislation concerning any of the nine social security benefits
categories recognized by the International Labor Organization: sickness and maternity, invalidity,
old age, survivors', unemployment, family, benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational
diseases, and death grants. "Social and medical assistance" on the other hand, is excluded under
Article 4(4). EC countries spend an average 25.6% of their GNP for social security programs. The
proportion of social security provided by the government, out of tax revenues, as opposed to the
proportion provided by private employer contributions and programs, varies greatly. At the ex-
tremes, the Danish government relies on tax revenues to foot the bill for 90% of the social security
expenses, while in France, the government share is 27.8%, with private employers providing the
remainder. BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 388, n.309.
57. This has caused enormous difficulty in many of the equal pay cases, because the nondis-
crimination obligation has been held to exclude state social security schemes, but to include em-
ployer-provided benefits.
58. There are a few limited exceptions. First, the EC has been quite successful in developing
arrangements to ensure social insurance coverage for "migrant" workers, i.e., those whose careers
lead them to consecutive employment in several countries. See infra text accompanying notes 60, 85.
Second, the EC has addressed issues of sex discrimination regarding certain aspects of benefit plans.
See infra note 59 and text accompanying notes 88-94. Third, in connection with employer insol-
vency, the EC has adopted a directive requiring Member States to ensure that workers' job loss
benefits are guaranteed. See infra text accompanying notes 105-09.
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mixed. 59 To support free movement of workers and to ensure nondis-
crimination based on EC nationality, the EC has legislated to coordinate,
rather than harmonize Member States' social security provisions to per-
mit workers to aggregate their time worked in several EC countries for
purposes of accrual and vesting of benefits. This legislation also ensures
that those eligible may collect their social security benefits, regardless of
where they reside within the EC at the time the benefits become
payable.6°
On the other hand, in the United States much of equal employment
law and virtually all individual employment rights, including the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, and more recent tort, contract, and statutory de-
velopments in derogation of managerial prerogatives, developed first at
state level. In these areas, there is either no broad federal legislation,
particularly as to wrongful termination, or the legislation contemplates
dual, overlapping federal and state regulation, as in the privacy areas
regarding polygraphs, 61 drug testing, 62 and confidentiality of medical
records. 63
At least until now, the absence of interstate uniformity has not suffi-
ciently burdened large, multistate companies to motivate them to press
for preemptive federal legislation, nor have the state-by-state differences
produced important competition-distorting effects. This may, in part, be
attributable to the constraining effect the threat of business flight has on
59. Employer-provided benefits fall within the article 119 equal pay requirement. See, e.g.,
Case 262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, 1990 E.C.R. 1889, 2 C.M.L.R.
513 (1990); Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Von Hartz, 1981 E.C.R.1607, 2 C.M.L.R. 701
(1986). A good discussion of the lengthy line of fringe benefit discrimination cases may be found in
PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 55-77, and in BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 232-46.
Governmental sex discrimination in social security programs is prohibited under the Social Security
Directive, Council Directive 79/7, 1979 O.J. (L 6) 24; discrimination in private plans is prohibited
under the Occupational Schemes Directive, Council Directive 86/378, 1986 O.J. (L 225) 40,
although its protection may be inferior to that provided directly under Article 119. See PRECHAL &
BURROWS, supra note 42, at 285-90. A proposal for a directive addressing social security matters
excluded from the Social Security Directive and the Occupational Schemes Directive, including re-
tirement and age, family allowances, and survivor's pension has been pending since November 19,
1987. 1987 O.J. (C 309) 10, discussed in PREtHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 293-96.
60. Council Regulation 1408/71, 1971 O.J. (L 149) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 1390/
81, 1981 O.J. (L 143) 1; Council Regulation 574/72, 1972 O.J. (L 74) 1, as amended by Council
Regulation 3795/81, 1981 O.J. (L 378) 1, Council Regulation 2001/83, 1983 O.J. (L 230) 6, Council
Regulation 2332/89, O.J. (L 224) 1, and Council Regulation 3427/89, 1989 O.J. (L 331) 1. See
generally JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 233-47 (3d ed. 1992).
61. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. § 2001-2009 (1988), particu-
larly § 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2009 (1988), preserving state remedies.
62. A good description of some of the federal laws may be found in Marion Crain, Expanded
Employee Drug-Detection Programs and the Public Good: Big Brother at the Bargaining Table, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1286, 1324-30, 1335-43 (1989).
63. See § 102(d) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp.
III 1991) (protecting confidentiality of medical records); § 501(b) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b)
(Supp. III 1991) (preserving authority of states to enact complementary regulation).
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state legislation. It is no accident that the most substantial derogation
from managerial control, the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine,
has been crafted by state judges rather than legislators.
By and large, in the U.S., minimum labor standards, particularly
regarding wages and hours, are set at the federal level. 64 Many states
copy these standards into their own legislation, sometimes with minor
additional protections for workers and often with a separate, complemen-
tary enforcement and remedial scheme.65
The American approach to equal employment law has no strong
analogue in EC law. Under Title V1166, the ADEA 67, and the ADA, 68
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission operates on an
integrated basis with state agencies administering parallel state laws. So
long as the state agency administers a state statute providing equal or
stronger protections against the type of discrimination addressed by the
federal law, EEOC and the state agency will coordinate their activities
pursuant to a work sharing-agreement, and provide the complaining
worker with a choice of legal forum. 69
The current EC institutional arrangements provide for private en-
forcement of directly binding EC regulation, as well as directly applica-
ble Treaty rights. Private law suits are litigated in the national courts,
with referral to the European Court of Justice to resolve unsettled as-
pects of EC law. 70 Actions brought by the European Commission or a
Member State to enforce Treaty obligations against an EC institution or
a Member State may be brought directly in the European Court of Jus-
tice.7 ' There are no EC-level administrative agencies, and in particular,
there are none analogous to EEOC. In the current EC institutional con-
64. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
65. Eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-210 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182
(West 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-203 (1992). See also ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.065 (1990) (em-
ployer must pay employee wages not less than fifty cents an hour greater than the prevailing federal
minimum wage).
66. See generally § 706(c)-(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(e) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
67. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
The provision providing for integration with state schemes is contained in § 14, 29 U.S.C. § 633
(1988).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (Supp. 1II 1991). The provision for integration with state schemes
is contained in § 501, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (Supp. III 1991).
69. See generally I CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.6, at
455-70 (2d ed. 1988); BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW 941-42 (2d ed. 1983) and 393-94 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
70. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 177. Private parties may neither sue nor be sued in the
Court of Justice. Such actions must be brought in national courts, which then use the Article 177
referral procedure to refer EC law questions to the Court of Justice. See STEINER, supra note 60, at
280-81.




figuration, nothing akin to the EEOC-state agency integrated administra-
tive scheme seems possible.72
The predominant instrument of EC legislation, in the labor sphere
as in most other areas, is the directive. A directive establishes a uniform,
EC-wide policy regarding legislative ends, but permits the Member States
to utilize divergent means to accomplish those ends. A directive operates
by requiring each Member State to enact its own law, unless one already
exists, which will accomplish the policy ends specified. 73 There have
been persistent problems with Member States failing to "transpose" di-
rectives into their national law in a timely fashion, although this foot-
dragging may cease in light of a recent Court of Justice decision holding
Member States liable to compensate individuals who could have recov-
ered against private parties had the Member State, in a timely fashion,
enacted legislation to implement an EC directive conferring rights upon
the individuals. 74
In practice, EC labor directives usually set minimum standards
which the Member States are free to exceed. In addition, labor directives
often either constrain the means by which the Member States may meet
the EC-mandate or they specify a series of alternative means, at least one
of which must be adopted. There are many examples of American labor
legislation which establish federal minimum standards, 75 but few require
or even encourage state legislation for implementation. The equal em-
ployment statutes, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act,76 per-
haps meet this exception, if one accepts encouragement in lieu of a
federal mandate. A closer parallel may be found in the U.S. unemploy-
ment insurance system, which involves federal criteria, implemented
72. Nevertheless, it should be noted, the EC is currently considering establishing an EC-level
occupational health and safety agency to administer its worker health and safety directives. 1992
O.J. (C169) 44 (Economic and Social Committee opinion regarding Commission proposal). This
agency, however, would be more akin to the American NIOSH, rather than to OSHA; its functions
would be scientific and advisory rather than regulatory.
73. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 189. See generally STEINER, supra note 60, at 20, 29, 37-
38.
74. Francovich v. Italian Republic, Cases C/6 & 9/90, 1991 E.C.R. 5357 (1990), discussed in
STEINER, supra note 60, at 283-84.
75. The plethora of safety standards set by regulation under OSHA are obvious examples. The
classic American labor standard is the minimum wage established under § 6(a) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C § 206(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The most recent example is the man-
dated minimum availability of family and medical leave with assurance of job protection upon return
to work under the recently signed Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3; 107 Stat. 6
(1993).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The provision for state plans is contained in
section 18, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1988).
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through state legislation and administration. 77 In U.S. social welfare leg-
islation, such as Medicare and Medicaid, as opposed to labor and em-
ployment law, one sees increasing instances of federally mandated
benefits which states are required to provide for their residents as a con-
dition of state participation in the federal program. 78
One can envision something akin to a directive as a constructive
approach to U.S. legislation on a subject such as wrongful termination, if
political consensus were to build sufficiently to support minimum criteria
for "cause" for discharge, while policymakers simultaneously wished to
preserve a realm for state experimentation. More likely, however, consis-
tent with U.S. lawmaking patterns, we would expect to see either legisla-
tion at the state level alone, partially harmonized voluntarily through a
model or uniform act, or, alternatively, Congress might enact a non-
preemptive federal statute permitting, but not requiring, state legislation
on the topic.
Like the EC directive, these methods achieve partial elimination of
interstate competition, but at the price of greater complexity and burden
for multistate enterprises and, often, greater variation in protections for
workers. One may wonder, however, about the likelihood of good faith
implementation of a directive-like U.S. federal statute absent a carrot or
a stick, such as the receipt or loss of federal funds. The EC countries,
with the possible exception of the U.K., may be more readily inclined to
internalize the legitimacy of the commands of a higher confederal au-
thority and voluntarily conform their laws to its mandates. On the other
hand, without any federal mandate whatsoever, the American political
process has voluntarily produced many partially harmonized bodies of
law through widespread state adoption of model or uniform laws. Where
the interests of business have strongly favored uniformity, we see results
such as the nearly universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code.7
9
With limited exceptions, already noted, the major EC labor policy
instruments, present and proposed, have taken the form of directives. A
77. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1988) (listing provisions which must be included in state unemployment
insurance laws).
78. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 604 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
79. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at I (3d
ed. 1988) (as of 1988, one of three consecutive official versions of the UCC was in effect in forty-nine
states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands; three retained the 1962 version, fourteen
retained the 1972 version and thirty-two had adopted the 1978 official text). Nevertheless, the UCC
as adopted by the states, is not entirely uniform, even among states which have adopted the same
version, because of local amendments to the text, adoption of optional provisions, and judicial inter-
pretation of open-ended statutory phraseology such as "good faith." Id. § 3, at 7-8.
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comparison of this corpus of present and proposed law to U.S. labor and
employment law is revealing.
First, one should note that the very existence of the Maastricht Pro-
tocol and Agreement on Social Policy signifies the victory of those polit-
ical forces who believe that the EC labor market and social conditions
should be made to gradually converge, at least in part, through the force
of legal standards. Advocates for this position appear to have triumphed
over those, such as the government of the U.K., who wish to achieve
approximation through market forces alone.80
Until now, much EC labor-related legislation was justified on the
rationale that approximation of the laws of Member States via an EC
directive would improve the functioning of the single labor market by
eliminating unfair competition. These directives were regarded as neces-
sary to bring a unitary labor market into being, and consensus that labor
competition between countries on these grounds was "unfair," i.e., so-
cially unacceptable, encompassed the U.K. as well as the other EC mem-
bers. Directives to ensure the free movement of workers without
discrimination on the basis of EC nationality,81 directives requiring non-
discrimination based on sex,82 equal remuneration based on sex,8 3 health
and safety,8 4 and regulations regarding coordination of Member States
social security systems to ensure no loss of benefits for workers migrating
across national boundaries,8 5 all fit this pattern.
Two observations should be made about the legislation in this cate-
gory. First, with a limited exception regarding the health and safety
80. BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 6.
81. Council Directive 90/364, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26 (free movement for citizens in general);
Council Directive 90/365, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 28 (free movement for workers and retirees); Council
Directive 90/366, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 30 (free movement for students). Free movement of workers is
regarded as one of the four fundamental freedoms, essential to the creation of the single market. See
Blanpain, supra note 41, para. 127. There is also a regulation to assure equal treatment of workers
based on EC Member State nationality. Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 254) 2,
as amended by Council Regulation 2434/92, 1992 O.J. (L 247) 1 and Council Regulation 312/76,
1976 O.J. (L 39) 2. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 145-157.
82. Equal Treatment Directive, Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40.
83. Council Directive 75/117, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19. Article 119 itself, requiring equal remuner-
ation, was specifically adopted, in part, to avoid competitive disadvantage to undertakings in states
which had adopted equal pay legislation when competing against businesses in other Member States.
Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena (Defrenne II), 1976 E.C.R. 455, 471-72, 2 C.M.L.R. 98, 110-11
(1976). See generally EVELYN ELLIS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SEX EQUALITY LAW 38-42 (1991).
84. Council Directive 89/391, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1. Numerous individual directives have been
adopted pursuant to this framework directive, and many more are proposed. See BLANPAIN, supra
note 41, paras. 261-281.
85. Council Regulation 1408/71, 1971 OJ. (L 149) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 1390/
81, 1981 O.J. (L 143) 1; Council Regulation 574/72, 1972 OJ. (L 74) 1, as amended by Council
Regulation 3795/81, 1981 O.J. (L 378) 1, Council Regulation 2001/83, 1983 O.J. (L 230) 6, Council
Regulation 2332/89, 1989 O.J. (L 224) 1, and Council Regulation 3427/89, 1989 O.J. (L 331) 1. See
generally STEINER, supra note 60, at 233-47.
[Vol. 68:1427
THE IMPACT OF THE EC ON LABOR LAW
framework directive,8 6 each of these laws addresses what Americans
would regard as individual rights, rather than collective interests in the
workplace. Second, to each of these directives there corresponds a paral-
lel body of law in the United States. Free movement of workers across
state lines, and nondiscrimination based on American state of origin, at
least where governmental action is involved, are established by the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 7 Equal remuneration for
women and men, as created by the EC Treaty itself,88 encompasses
claims similar to those which may be brought under the U.S. Equal Pay
Act, 89 as well as those viable under the broadened prohibition against
intentional sex discrimination in any form of compensation contained in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.90 Indeed, at least as amplified
86. The health and safety directive includes provisions for consultation with worker representa-
tives. Council Directive 89/391, art. 11, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1.
87. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 7-2 to 7-4, at 548-59 (2d ed. 1988).
88. For a detailed analysis of EC caselaw interpreting Article 119, see PRECHAL & BURROWS,
supra note 42, at 49-81; ELLIS, supra note 83 at 42-82.
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The Equal Pay Act prohibits the payment
of unequal compensation to men and women performing "substantially equal" work requiring equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions. To the extent that
the EC equal pay directive encompasses something closer to what Americans have labelled "pay
equity" or "comparable worth," it resembles an earlier version of the bill which was ultimately
enacted as the Equal Pay Act, and which would have reached "work of comparable value." H.R.
10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4 (1962), and H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (1961), would
identically have prohibited an employer from "paying wages to any employee at a rate less than the
rate at which he pays wages to any employee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character
on jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, except where such payment is made
pursuant to a seniority or merit increase system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex."
The following year, the administration's bill, H.R. 3861, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a), (1963), would
have prohibited an employer from "paying wages at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
to any employee of the opposite sex in such place of employment for equal work on jobs the per-
formance of which requires equal skills, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority
or merit increase system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex." A major difference be-
tween even the administration's proposed bill and the Equal Pay Act as enacted is that "It]he con-
cept of equal pay for jobs demanding equal skill has been expanded to require equal effort,
responsibility, and similar working conditions as well." H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 690 (supplemental views).
90. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin, as to compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). Section 703(h) of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), however, permits employers to defend against such claims by
relying on the affirmative defenses provided under the Equal Pay Act, which include pay differentia-
tion on the basis of the quantity or quality of production, seniority, merit, and any other factor other
than sex. In County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), the Supreme Court accepted
the plaintiff's contention that the prohibition against sex discrimination in compensation under Title
VII reached farther than the Equal Pay Act, and encompassed all forms of intentional, sex-based
differentiation in compensation, subject to the stated defenses. See also Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385 (1986) (accepting claim of intentional race-based discrimination in compensation regarding
substantially different, but comparable, jobs under Title VII). However, the Gunther Court ex-
pressly disavowed accepting broader notions of comparable worth. 452 U.S. at 166. In subsequent
cases, the lower courts have consistently rejected compensation discrimination claims absent proof of
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through the EC equal pay directive, community law goes farther than
that, verging on theories of pay equity and comparable worth which in
the U.S. failed to achieve a legal toehold during the Reagan-Bush years.9'
"Equal treatment" for men and women in the EC has been inter-
preted to encompass both "direct" and "indirect" discrimination. 92
Americans would apply the European label "direct" discrimination to
what our courts categorize as "intentional discrimination," including fa-
cial discrimination and disparate treatment. "Indirect discrimination"
would roughly correspond to "disparate impact," as codified under Title
VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 93 Despite some impor-
tant differences, 94 the prohibitions against sex discrimination in the U.S.
and the EC seek similar ends via roughly similar means.
intentional discrimination in the setting of the remuneration, unless the jobs were substantially
equal, hence stated a claim under the equal pay act. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois,
783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
91. The directive defines the Article 119 obligation of equal pay for men and women as requir-
ing equal pay "for the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of
all discrimination on grounds of sex, with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration."
Judicial characterization of the directive as merely elaborating the scope of Article 119, and inter-
preting the proscription to reach "indirect' as well as "direct" discrimination, is discussed in depth in
PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 81-98; ELLIS, supra note 83, at 96-116. Characterizing the
treaty provision as encompassing the same scope of claims as the directive permits private parties to
sue other private parties, even where the Member State in which both reside has yet to adopt na-
tional legislation implementing the directive. Provided the different compensation of men and wo-
men is facially apparent from the nature of the employment practice, the alleged victim of
discrimination may rely directly on Article 119 in a suit against her employer brought in her na-
tional court or tribunal.
92. The Equal Treatment Directive, Council Directive 76/207, art. 2(1), 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40,
states in part, "the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination
whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or
family status." The Court of Justice has relied on this language to construe the remaining provisions
of the directive, prohibiting discrimination in employment selection criteria, access to jobs and pro-
motions, vocational training and retraining, dismissal, and working conditions, as reaching both
direct and indirect discrimination. See PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 12-21, 71-77 (dis-
cussing these concepts regarding nationality discrimination, equal pay, and equal treatment on the
basis of sex).
93. Section 703(k)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l), as amended by Pub. L. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1074(k)(1) (1991).
94. In addition to differences noted above, an extremely significant difference is the treatment of
the complex of issues surrounding pregnancy, reproductive health hazards, motherhood, and chil-
drearing. See PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 115-18. For example, the EC recently
adopted a directive in the nature of protective legislation for pregnant women and those who have
recently given birth. This directive resolves the conflict between women's demands for equality and
autonomous risk-taking, on the one hand, and social protection for the health of all workers as well
as children, on the other. The EC solution is very different from that reached by the U.S. Supreme
Court in construing Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, and related medical conditions. Compare Council Directive 92/85, art. 5, 1992 O.J. (L 348) 1
(requiring removal of pregnant or breastfeeding women from positions entailing exposure to fetal
health hazards if the employer cannot otherwise modify the worker's job duties or working condi-
tions, but mandating no loss of pay) with International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct.
1196, 1202-04 (1991) (construing Title VII to prohibit involuntary protection of women, but not
men, from reproductive health hazards they choose to encounter); id. at 1207 ("Employment late in
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A caveat could be added here. The decision by the EC Member
States to include a prohibition against sex-based wage discrimination in
the original EEC Treaty was motivated by fear of interstate economic
competition, as well as by moral imperatives regarding sex discrimina-
tion.95 Member States with higher labor costs already feared the height-
ened risk of capital flight to competing EC countries with uniformly low
compensation costs. High labor-cost states with equal pay legislation in
force wished to preclude sex-based wage competition from further stimu-
lating capital mobility. Absent an equal remuneration provision, they
feared that a great deal of capital investment would be shifted to those
Member States having an available, low wage, predominantly female
workforce to undercut the higher prevailing wages of male workers at the
original site of the operation. However, the legislative history of the
American Equal Pay Act likewise reflects an often forgotten yet similar
desire on the part of some of the bill's supporters to preserve jobs for men
by mandating equal pay for women, and to prevent "unfair competition"
through payment of substandard wages to women for performing "men's
work."
96
pregnancy often imposes risks on the unborn child .... but Congress indicated that the employer
may take into account only the woman's ability to get her job done.").
In addition, the preamble to the EC pregnancy directive specifically disavows "an analogy be-
tween pregnancy and illness," 1992 O.J. (L 348) at 2, while the American prohibition against
pregnancy-related discrimination in employment specifies that "women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related purposes...
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... Sec. 701(k) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k).
95. See Defrenne v. Sabena (Defrenne II), 1976 E.C.R. 455, 472-73. See generally PRECHAL &
BURROWS, supra note 42, at 53.
96. In the declaration of purpose portion of the bill enacted as the Equal Pay Act, like each of
its major predecessor bills, H.R. 3861, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(5) (1963); H.R. 10226, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(5) (1962); and H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(5) (1961), Congress
finds, inter alia, that "wage differentials based on sex.., constitutes an unfair method of competi-
tion." Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(a)(5); 77 Stat. 56 (1963), reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. 59. See also, e.g., Hearings Before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee
on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 8898; H.R. 10226,
pt. 1, at 2 ("Although women would have more to gain than men..., such a law would protect men
as well as women from discriminatory rates .... [T]o women... it signifies justice in wage treat-
ment; to men - it helps sustain wage rates and discourages employers from hiring women at lower
rates .... ) (statement of Chairman Zelenko); id. at 11 ("The bill would diminish the possibilities
of using women to force wages down and of taking advantage of the sharp competition for jobs in
times of substantial unemployment.") (statement of Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg).
This is not to suggest, however, that benign motives did not play the leading role in persuading
Congress to adopt the Equal Pay Act; rather, these pro-women motives tend to be remembered to
the exclusion of the pro-men objectives. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,
195-201 (1974). The Equal Pay Act was passed "to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and
endemic problem of [sex based] employment discrimination in private industry-the fact that the
wage structure of 'many segments of American industry has been based on an ancient but outmoded
belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even though his
duties are the same.'" Id. at 195, (quoting S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., 1 (1963). See also
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166-69 (1981)).
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The EC's health and safety framework directive 97 was modelled in
many respects after the American Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), 98 one of the few examples of a U.S. labor law development
crossing the Atlantic to the east, when the prevailing winds generally
blow toward the west. Proposed prohibitions and restrictions on child
labor99 have their counterparts in the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act. °0
Finally, the regulations on transnational social security 10 ' serve a func-
tion similar to the U.S. interstate coordination rules regarding unemploy-
ment insurance,'0 2 as well as the federalizing aspects of ERISA, in easing
benefit losses to workers who seek new jobs across state lines.
Encouraging worker mobility, eliminating discrimination in the la-
bor market, and taking abuse of worker health and safety and the ex-
ploitation of child labor out of the realm of lawful means of business
competition reflect policies essential to any well-functioning, unified la-
bor market in a democratic society. It is hardly surprising therefore, that
similar policies which address these topics exist both in the U.S. and the
EC-they are premised on models of the labor market which assume
autonomous individual workers as actors. The most noteworthy excep-
tion to this parallelism is the presence in the U.S., and the absence at the
EC level in the European Community, of enforceable prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of factors other than sex or state of
origin, including race, color, religion, national origin, age and disability.
The remaining enacted EC labor directives, as well as pending pro-
posed directives, highlight the major divergence in social philosophy and
labor policy between the EC and the US. In the 1970s, while a labor
government was in power in the U.K., the EC adopted three important
policies focusing on collective interests of workers: the 1975 directive on
collective redundancies,' 0 3 the 1977 directive on transfers of opera-
tions, 1°4 and the 1980 directive on insolvencies. 105
97. Council Directive 89/391, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1.
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
99. Proposed Council Directive, 1992 O.J. (C 84) 7.
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
101. Council Regulation 1408/71, 1971 O.J. (L 149) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 1390/
81, 1981 O.J. (L 143) 1; Council Regulation 574/72, 1972 O.J. (L 74) 1, as amended by Council
Regulation 3795/81, 1981 O.J. (L 378) 5, Council Regulation 2001/83, 1983 O.J. (L 230) 6, Council
Regulation 2332/89, 1989 O.J. (L 224) 1, and Council Regulation 3427/89, 1989 O.J. (L 331) 1.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
103. Council Directive, 75/129, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, as amended by Council Directive 92/56,
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3.
104. Council Directive, 77/187, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26.
105. Council Directive, 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23, as amended by Council Directive 87/164,
1987 O.J. (L 66) 11. A thorough discussion of the three directives may be found in Janice Bellace,
Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413 (1984). Comparisons employing the
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The directive on insolvencies requires all EC Member States to en-
act legislation ensuring full payment of workers' earned compensation
during a specified time period, as well as full payment of their state social
security system benefits, even if the employer failed to transmit the with-
held employee contributions.10 6 This directive may be compared with
U.S. federal bankruptcy law priorities for workers' pay and pensions. 0 7
The EC directive is more limited than the U.S. worker priority rules in
one respect: the EC directive applies only to outright liquidations, simi-
lar to U.S. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and not to corporate reorganizations in
bankruptcy, akin to those under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. 108 On the other hand, the EC directive guarantees workers their
pay, rather than merely establishing priority vis i vis other unsecured
creditors and behind all secured creditors. The EC directive accom-
plishes this by requiring each Member State to establish an insurance
fund, out of which employees' claims are paid if the employers' assets,
under ordinary rules of bankruptcy liquidation, are insufficient to satisfy
their claims. 109
The 1975 EC directive on collective redundancies, strengthened by
June 24, 1992 amendments, provides several illuminating comparisons to
U.S. labor law. The directive requires all employers employing more
than a minimum threshold of employees, who terminate or permanently
lay off those workers for reasons unrelated to the individual, to assure
underlying law of EC Member States regarding these matters maybe found in Clyde W. Summers,
Comparative Perspectives, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 139 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel
G. Collins eds., 1988).
106. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 322-328.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988) (priority for unpaid wages); id. § 507(a)(4) (priority for unpaid
pension benefits).
108. The directive states, in part:
[A]n employer shall be deemed to be in a state of insolvency:
(a) where a request has been made for the opening of proceedings involving the em-
ployer's assets, ... to satisfy collectively the claims of creditors .... and
(b) where the authority which is competent... has: either decided to open the pro-
ceedings, or established that the employer's undertaking or business has been definitively
closed down and that the available assets are insufficient to warrant the opening of the
proceedings.
In cases of reorganization under the protection of the court ("judicial leave to suspend payment of
debts"), unlike cases of outright liquidation, Council Directive 77/187 regarding transfers of under-
takings appears to apply, rather than the insolvency directive. See Case No. 135/83, Abels v. The
Administrative Board of the Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaal-industrie en de Electrotechnische
Industrie, 1985 E.C.R. 469, 2 C.M.L.R. 406 (1985), discussed in BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras.
307-308. In addition, under the new amendments to the collective redundancy directive, duties of
notification, information, and consultation apparently apply to plant closings or mass layoffs result-
ing from judicial orders in bankruptcy reorganizations. See Council Directive 92/56, art. l(1)(b),
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3, 4 (deleting "[t]his Directive shall not apply to ... workers affected by the
termination of an establishment's activities where that is the result of a judicial decision"), (amend-
ing Council Directive 75/129, art. 1(2), 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29).
109. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 326-328.
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them of at least thirty days notice, and to notify the appropriate state
authorities involved in assisting displaced workers.' 10 This directive
should sound familiar to Americans working in the labor law field be-
cause similar provisions became embodied in U.S. law after vigorous
resistance by the business lobby as well as the Reagan-Bush administra-
tions, by the 1988 passage of the federal Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act (WARN).11'
There are important differences between WARN, however, and the
EC's directive on collective dismissals. First, the EC law applies to rela-
tively small reductions in force, while WARN applies only to facility clo-
sures and mass layoffs of substantial size. 112 Second, U.S. law exempts
small and even medium size businesses and facilities by its thresholds for
coverage, while the EC directive covers almost all establishments.' 1 3
Thus, the EC directive embodies the concept that workers who lose their
jobs through no fault of their own, are at a minimum entitled to advance
notice and a modest level of income security." 4 Indeed, most EC coun-
tries also have employment termination statutes which provide for pay
110. Council Directive 75/129, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, as amended by Council Directive 92/56,
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3. see BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 283-293.
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (1988) defines "mass layoff," one of the two types of qualifying
events triggering notice obligations on the part of the employer, as:
a reduction in force which-
(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day
period for-
(i) (I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees).
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2) (1988) defines "plant closing," the other qualifying event triggering statutory
obligations, as a "permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more
facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an employ-
ment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees
excluding any part-time employees."
Council Directive 75/129 defines "collective redundancy," the triggering event under the direc-
tive, as any dismissal for reasons unrelated to the individual workers involved, and sets far lower
numerical thresholds. The Member State may choose the graduated numerical trigger, of at least ten
dismissals in an establishment with 20-99 workers, dismissal of at least 10 per cent of the workforce
in an establishment with 100-299 workers, and dismissal of at least 30 workers in an establishment
with 300 or more employees. Alternatively, the Member State may elect to trigger the employer's
redundancy obligations whenever 20 or more employees are terminated within a 90 day period,
regardless of the number of workers employed. Under the new amendments to the collective redun-
dancy directive, so long as at least five workers lose their jobs because of a reduction in force, all
terminations of employment contracts by the employer, of whatever type, are to be aggregated in
determining whether the numerical threshold has been reached. Council Directive 92/56, art. 1 (1),
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3, 4 (amending Council Directive 75/129, art. 1 (1)).
113. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) (setting a threshold of 50 or more full-time
equivalent workers for statutory coverage) with Council Directive 75/129, art. I (setting the thresh-
olds set forth supra note 110).
114. See, e.g., Bellace, supra note 105, at 416-17; Summers, supra note 105, at 161.
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akin to American severance pay. Read together with the protections
against collective dismissal, such statutes assure most workers of an ex-
tended period of income security in the event of termination without
cause. 115
Third, WARN provides for employer notice to the workers' union
representative if they have a collective bargaining agent, and otherwise,
for notice to each individual employee.1 16 WARN expressly does not
otherwise affect U.S. labor law, and the NLRA continues to govern the
extent to which an employer has a duty to bargain collectively over a
decision to relocate and its effects on the workers, as well as a duty to
supply information relevant to the bargaining. 117 Current case law sug-
gests that an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to totally
cease operations, for whatever reason;' "8 a duty to bargain over any sort
of capital redeployment decision motivated by the employer's desire to
chill interest in unionization in the employer's remaining facilities, 119 no
duty to bargain over a decision to leave a line of business entirely unless
the employer is motivated by anti-union animus, 120 a duty to bargain
over runaway shops, where relocation of operations is based on the em-
ployer's desire to escape the union,121 a duty to bargain over plant reloca-
tions, subcontracting, operational consolidation and other capital
redeployment decisions whenever they are motivated by anti-union ani-
mus, 122 a duty to bargain over decisions to subcontract operations, at
least where the decision is tantamount to substitution of the contractor's
workforce for the employer's, 23 and a duty to bargain over these types of
capital redeployment decisions whenever they depend on labor costs, or
perhaps other labor-related factors. 124 Much of this case law is hotly
115. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE COM-
PARATIVE STUDY ON RULES GOVERNING WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES, Sec.
(89) 926 final at 10-11 (1989) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT].
116. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (1988).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 2105 (1988).
118. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); see also Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
119. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 274-75.
120. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490 (1989)
(construing Railway Labor Act); First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682 (construing NLRA).
121. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 275-76.
122. See, e.g., Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1991); Strawsine Mfg. Co.,
280 N.L.R.B. 553 (1986). See also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211
(1964) (holding that a decision to subcontract janitorial operations on the facility premises consti-
tuted a mandatory subject of bargaining, without regard to motive); Darlington, 380 U.S. at 269-74
(distinguishing such forms of anti-union motivated capital redeployment from the decision to com-
pletely go out of business).
123. Fibreboard Paper Prods, 379 U.S. at 209.
124. Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (1991), is the NLRB's latest major pronounce-
ment in this area. To the questionable extent that it retains viability after Pittsburgh A Lake Erie
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contested and changes with the changing composition of the Board.125
In addition, there is always a duty to bargain over the effects capital rede-
ployment decisions have on the workers, including severance pay, early
retirement or other special compensation packages, transfers to other po-
sitions or locations operated by the employer, job retraining, outplace-
ment assistance and the like.1 26 While U.S. employers have furiously
opposed bearing a duty to bargain over redeployment decisions, they
have been less adamant about bargaining over effects, and the case law
about effects bargaining appears to be well-settled.
Finally, U.S. labor law obligates an employer to supply the union
with information relevant to the scope of mandatory bargaining.1 27 To
the extent that an employer need not bargain over the decision, but only
over its effects on workers, the employer avoids any duty to disclose fi-
nancial and operational information underlying the restructuring
decision.
The EC directive charts quite a different course. Any employer
whose workers have a representative has a duty to supply the representa-
tive with information pertaining to the redeployment decision, as well as
its effects on the work force, and must "begin consultations with the
workers' representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agree-
ment."1 28 This differs from U.S. law in many ways. First, this aspect of
the directive, like the notice provision, applies to nearly all employers
and nearly all reduction-in-force related job terminations. In the U.S.
collective bargaining context, the NLRB is more likely to find a duty to
bargain over a decision affecting only a few workers, which will be la-
belled a lay off, and analyzed as an employment decision. ' 29 Elimination
R.R., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), characterizes most
forms of capital redeployment as mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act.
125. Compare Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (holding to be a mandatory subject
of bargaining, plant relocations in which labor costs are a motivating factor), with Otis Elevator Co.,
269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (relocations are mandatory subject only when the decision turns on labor
costs). The conflicting lines of cases regarding capital redeployment decisions are discussed in Mar-
ley S. Weiss, Risky Business: Age and Race Discrimination in Capital Redeployment Decisions, 48
MD. L. REV. 901, 939-75, 990-94 (1989).
126. See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 516
(1989) (construing Railway Labor Act); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-
82 (1981) (construing NLRA).
127. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co, 385 U.S. 432 (1967) (employer must supply information
necessary to permit union to intelligently process grievance arising under the collective bargaining
agreement); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (employer who pleads poverty must
provide union with access to full information about employer's financial health).
128. Council Directive 75/129, art. 2 (3), as amended by Council Directive 92/56, 1992 O.J. (L
245) 4 (duty to supply "all relevant information"), id. art. 2 (1) ("begin consultations with the
workers' representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agreement"). See BLANPAIN, supra
note 41, paras. 288-290.
129. See, e.g., Adair Standish Corp., 292 N.L.R.B. 101 (1989); Morco Indus., Inc., 279
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of a shift, department, or facility, however, will be perceived as having
left the realm of employment decisions and become, instead, an en-
trepreneurial decision with direct effects on workers' jobs.130 The deci-
sion will then be subjected to a balancing test which has produced the
complex and manipulable rules discussed above regarding whether an
employer owes the union a duty to bargain over its decision. 131
Second, the purpose of the EC directive is to give the workers' repre-
sentative adequate notice, information and opportunity to propose crea-
N.L.R.B. 762, 762-63 (1986). See also First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677 ("Other man-
agement decisions, such as the order of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and
work rules, are almost exclusively 'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and employee
.... " (hence mandatory bargaining subjects)) (quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)).
130. See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677 ("The present case concerns a third type of
management decision, one that had a direct impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably elimi-
nated by the termination, but had as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract with
Greenpark, a concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment relationship. This deci-
sion, involving a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise, is akin to the decision whether
to be in business at all, 'not in [itself] primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of
the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment,' ...... At the same time, this decision
touches on a matter of central and pressing concern to the union and its member employees: the
possibility of continued employment and the retention of the employees' very jobs.") (quoting
Fibreboard Paper Prod, 379 U.S., at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
131. The balancing test is set forth in First National Maintenance:
[B]argaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management
relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the con-
duct of the business." 452 U.S. at 679. The Court's application of the test sheds some light
on its otherwise abstract content: "We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an
employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business
purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained
through the union's participation in making the decision, and we hold that the decision
itself is not part of § 8(d)'s 'terms and conditions' ... over which Congress has mandated
bargaining.
Id. at 686.
Later in the decision, the Court delineated its holding somewhat differently:
In order to illustrate the limits of our holding, we turn again to the specific facts of this
case. First, we note that when petitioner decided to terminate its Greenpark contract, it
had no intention to replace the discharged employees or to move that operation elsewhere.
Petitioner's sole purpose was to reduce its economic loss, and the union made no claim of
antiunion animus. In addition, petitioner's dispute with Greenpark was solely over the size
of the management fee Greenpark was willing to pay. The union had no control or author-
ity over that fee .... These facts in particular distinguish this case from the subcontracting
issue presented in Fibreboard. Further, the union was not selected as the bargaining repre-
sentative or certified until well after petitioner's economic difficulties at Greenpark had
begun. We thus are not faced with an employer's abrogation of ongoing negotiations or an
existing bargaining agreement. Finally, while petitioner's business enterprise did not in-
volve the investment of large amounts of capital in single locations, we do not believe that
the absence of "significant investment or withdrawal of capital," is crucial. The decision to
halt work at this specific location represented a significant change in petitioner's opera-
tions, a change not unlike opening a new line of business or going out of business entirely.
Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted). The NLRB has had extreme difficulty applying the language of the
opinion to the diverse, concrete factors involved in capital redeployment cases. Compare Dubuque




tive alternatives which can reduce if not eradicate entirely the
elimination of workers' jobs. 32 Failing that, the workers' representatives
are provided with an opportunity to present proposals to ameliorate the
consequences for the terminated workers, 33 much like "effects" bargain-
ing in U.S. labor law.' 34
Third, the EC's stated mandatory notice period is only thirty days,
compared to sixty days under WARN. 35 On the other hand, EC Mem-
ber States may legislate longer notice periods, 36 those with periods
shorter than sixty days may authorize appropriate governmental authori-
ties, "in cases where the problems raised by the projected collective re-
dundancies are not likely to be solved withing the initial period," to
extend the notification period for up to a total of sixty days, and any
Member State may grant its appropriate agency broader authority to ex-
tend or reduce the advance notice period in particular cases or classes of
cases. 137
The fourth difference is that consultation over the redeployment de-
cision is just that-consultation and not negotiation. Under most Mem-
ber States' laws, workers may not lawfully bring economic weapons to
bear, and are limited to persuasion and moral suasion.' 38
Here, however, the difference compared to American labor law may
be less real than it seems. Most American collective bargaining agree-
132. See Council Directive 92/56, art. 2 (2), 1992 O.J. (L 245) 4, (amending Council Directive
75/129, art. 2 (2), 1975 O.J. (L 48) 30) ("These consultations shall, at least, cover ways and means of
avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected.").
133. See id. ("These consultations shall, at least, cover ways and means ... of mitigating the
consequences by recourse to accompanying social measures amid, inter alia, aid for redeploying or
retraining workers made redundant").
134. The duty to bargain over effects remains well-settled in American labor law. See First Nat'l
Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681-82. ("There is no dispute that the union must be given a significant
opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the 'effects' bargaining man-
dated by § 8(a)(5). And, under § 8(a)(5), bargaining over the effects of a decision must be conducted
in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, and the Board may impose sanctions to insure its
adequacy") (citations omitted).
135. Compare Council Directive 75/129, art. 4(1) with § 2102(a) of WARN, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)
(1988) (flat sixty day notice requirement) and id. § 2102(b) (identifying exceptional circumstances
justifying unilateral employer provision of a shorter notice period).
136. Council Directive 75/129, art. 5. In addition, the thirty day minimum is triggered by no-
tice to the state authorities, which can only be given notice after reasonable consultation with work-
ers' representatives because it must include information about the consultations. See id. art. 3 (1).
In effect, therefore, the minimum notice to workers representatives is considerably more than thirty
days.
137. Id. art. 4 (1), (3). Member States may also exempt from the advance notification require-
ment those cases where the collective redundancies are caused by "termination of the establishment's
activities where this is the result of a judicial decision," primarily in cases of insolvency, or may do
so subject to the possibility of the appropriate governmental agency nonetheless requiring advance
notice in particular cases. Council Directive 92/129, art. 1 (3), (4) (amending Council Directive 75/
129, art. 3 (1)).
138. See Bellace, supra note 105, at 428-29. See also BLAINPAIN, supra note 2, paras. 79-80.
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ments contain no-strike provisions which severely limit the unions' lever-
age when faced with a mid-term capital redeployment. 139 In addition,
where the entire facility is to be closed, U.S. unions often have no real
weapon in the threat of a work stoppage, even absent a no-strike provi-
sion. 140 The European workers' representatives, on the other hand, may
have real, albeit informal leverage in their co-decision-making power
over other matters, providing management with a strong inducement to
maintain amicable relations. 141 One might compare the position of the
workers' representatives, under these circumstances, to the situation in
American labor law of an employer "voluntarily" acceding to a powerful
union's desire to bargain over a permissive subject of bargaining, over
which the employer is lawfully entitled to decline to bargain, lest the
relationship rupture in a fashion more costly to the employer over
mandatory bargaining subjects.
As to the effects of restructuring decisions on workers, the EC em-
ployer's duty is one of "consultations . . .with a view to reaching an
agreement." 142 Professor Blanpain characterizes this obligation as verg-
ing on a duty to bargain in good faith.143 Significantly, the obligation to
supply information under the EC directive is far more substantial than a
U.S. employer's duty to supply information related to collective bargain-
ing. The EC employer must provide "all relevant information" and:
[I]n any event notify the workers' representative in writing of (i) the
reasons for the redundancies; (ii) the number and categories of workers
to be made redundant; (iii) the number and categories of workers nor-
mally employed; (iv) the period over which the projected redundancies
are to be effected; (v) the criteria proposed for the selection of the
workers to be made redundant... ; (vi) the method for calculating any
redundancy payments other than those arising out of national legisla-
tion and practice.'144
European workers' representatives are afforded sufficiently detailed infor-
139. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIc PATrERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS at 93 (1 th
ed. 1986) (no-strike clauses found in 94% of surveyed agreements).
140. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 144-48, 509-23 (1976).
141. For example, see Professor Janice Bellace's description of the German works council's lev-
erage in negotiation of the "social plan" regarding treatment of any reduction-in-force. Bellace,
supra note 105, at 440-41.
142. Council Directive 75/129, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, art. 2 (1), as amended by Council Directive
92/56, art. 2 (1), 1992 O.J. (L 245) 4. To the extent that the ways and means of avoiding the
redundancies or reducing the numbers of workers affected entails bargaining over the capital rede-
ployment decision itself, rather than its consequences for workers, the same duty apparently applies
to consultation over the decision.
143. BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 290; BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras. 79, 80. See also Bel-
lace, supra note 105, at 428-29 (definition depends on national law).
144. Council Directive 75/129, art. 2 (3), 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, as amended by Council Directive
92/56, art. 2 (3), 1992 O.J. (L 245) 3, 4.
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mation about the company's operations, present and future, to make via-
ble the possibility that they will propose useful alternatives to reductions
in force and truly helpful paliatives for the impact on those workers who
lose their positions. 145
Last, only about 12% of the private sector U.S. labor force is cur-
rently represented by a union,1 46 and no duty to bargain, inform or con-
sult applies to them except the sixty day notice requirement established
by WARN.1 47 In the EC, the term "workers' representatives" encom-
passes the several types of representatives, including trade unions and
works councils, who represent the interests of workers in dealing with
management regarding the determination of conditions of employment
through collective bargaining, consultation, or other processes, pursuant
to the diverse labor relations laws of the Member States.1 48  In several
EC countries, every employer above a modest size threshold is required
to consult with a works council or other body composed of representa-
tives elected from among the ranks of the workers at the facility. 49 Con-
sequently, the directive applies to a much higher percentage of the EC
workforce than does the U.S. labor law duty to bargain.
The 1978 directive on transfers of operations presents an even
145. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 289.
146. The most recent statistic regarding the percentage of private sector workers who are union
members is 11.8%, according to U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich's testimony during his Senate
confirmation hearings. See Confirmation Hearings Roundup, Congress Daily, Jan. 7, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGDLY File. Counting public sector along with private sector, union
membership has declined to 16% of the workforce. Today's Summary & Analysis, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 238, at A-A (Dec. 10, 1992). The percentage of private sector workers represented
by a union may be a bit higher, because unions represent all the members of a bargaining unit,
include those who decline to join the union and pay full union dues. On the other hand, the number
could be an overestimate, because many unions count laid-off members or retirees or both on their
membership lists. Despite the need for caution in comparing national union membership statistics,
which may rely on different factors in counting members, one may readily conclude that "the United
States remains a country of low union density in comparison with ... most of Western Europe."
Clara Chang & Constance Sorrentino, Union Membership Statistics in 12 Countries, 114 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 46 (Dec. 1991). The three most unionized EC countries are Denmark, with 75% of its
workforce in labor unions, Italy, with 50%, and the UK, with 40%. Most of the other countries
ranged from one-quarter to one-third unionization, except for France, which has a rate of union
membership even lower than that of the United States. Id. at 46-52.
147. Under the NLRA, the employer's duty to bargain, and the attendant duty to supply infor-
mation, apply only to a union representing a majority of the workers in an appropriate bargaining
unit. NLRA §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1988).
148. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 89 (" 'Representation of workers' [in Agreement on
Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2 (3)] relates to e.g., works councils, shop stewards, committees of
health and safety, staff associations, and the like as well as to representation through trade unions
and at different levels: plant, enterprise, group of enterprises, multinational enterprises included,
sectoral, national and European."); BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 286 (workers' representatives as
established pursuant to Member States' law).
149. See SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 115, at 12-13. See generally Christopher Docksey, Em-
ployee Information and Consultation Rights in the Member States of the European Communities, 7
CoMP. LAB. L. 32 (1985).
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sharper contrast with U.S. labor policy. Absent a collective bargaining
agreement, under U.S. law, if a business is sold to another employer, the
new employer is usually held to be under no obligation to accept the
individual labor contract of a worker, express or implied.' 50 The pur-
chaser, or "successor" employer is free not to hire the predecessors' em-
ployees, 51 and free to offer employment on terms entirely different from
those provided by the predecessor. Only if the successor voluntarily "as-
sumes" the contract do the individual workers' employment rights re-
main unaltered. Moreover, absent an express contractual provision to
the contrary, the predecessor employer will be viewed as having commit-
ted neither to obtaining the successors' assent to assumption of the con-
tract nor to any promise of continuation of the contract or the terms
arising thereunder for any particular duration.
The law relating to successorship as to collective bargaining agree-
ments is substantially identical to that relating to individual agreements.
Unless the successor company voluntarily assumes the collective bargain-
ing agreement, it is free to disregard it, even if the successor was aware of
a contractual promise by the predecessor to require assumption of the
agreement by any successor. The union's remedies for the breach run
only against the predecessor employer. 52
Moreover, by its structuring of the sale and of subsequent opera-
tions, the successor can often avoid any duty to recognize and bargain
with the union. The new operation is a successor only if it is essentially a
continuation of the earlier business.' 3 Assuming that prerequisite is
met, the employer only owes the union a duty to recognize it and bargain
with it if it hires a majority of its workforce from among the employees
who work for its predecessor. 5 4 While it is illegal for the successor to
discriminate in its hiring based on union status, 55 including status as a
150. Indeed, in most jurisdictions, the employee is terminable for any reason or no reason, ab-
sent a contract to the contrary, and excepting reasons violative of public policy or statute. See Peter
Linzer, The Decline of Assent. At- Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law
Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 335-68 (1986) (summarizing case law developments from many Ameri-
can jurisdictions). An individual employment contract is assumable by the purchaser of a business,
but under ordinary rules of contract law, would have to be affirmatively assumed by the purchaser
for the purchaser to be bound. In light of the at-will nature of most employment "contracts," how-
ever, the point seldom arises.
151. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 260-62, 264 (1974);
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972).
152. Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 258 n.3.
153. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 36-41 (1987); Burns Int'l
Security Servs., 406 U.S. at 272, 280 n.4; Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 259.
154. Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 47; Burns, 406 U.S. at 278-79. Howard Johnson Co., on the
other hand, relies on cases characterizing successorship as dependent on the proportion of the prede-
cessor's workforce hired by the successor.
155. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
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member of the union's bargaining unit with the predecessor, 56 many
successors advertize widely, slash wages and benefits, and generate an
applicant pool permitting them to hire much less than a majority of their
workforce from among the ranks of the predecessor's employees while
rendering it nearly impossible to establish illegal discrimination. t57
Moreover, even if a duty to bargain with the union does attach to the
successor, the successor is free to bargain from scratch, ignoring previous
terms and conditions of employment. 58
The EC directive takes a diametrically opposed position, again
premised on worker entitlement to continued employment absent good
justification and on the productivity of involvement of workers' repre-
sentatives in solving difficult social problems stemming from the work-
place. Successor employers must assume, intact, the individual contract
of the predecessors' employees, 59 as well as any applicable collective
agreement. 160 New ownership is not grounds for dismissal of workers by
predecessor or successor employers, although the successor is permitted
to restructure for economic, technical or organizational reasons and to
engage in any resulting dismissal of employees.' 6' If the business "pre-
serves its autonomy" in the course of the sale, the workers' representa-
tives retain their status as such despite the transfer of ownership. 162 The
predecessor and successor both have a duty to inform and consult with
the workers' representatives regarding the effects of the sale on the busi-
156. Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 40; Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 262 & n.8; Burns, 406
U.S. at 280 & n.5.
157. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions
and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 108-09 (1988) [hereinafter Stone, Labor and the
Corporate Structure]. See also Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 41 (successorship largely "rests in the
hands of the successor. If the new employer makes a conscious decision to maintain generally the
same business and to hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor, then the bargaining
obligation of § 8(a)(5) is activated."); Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 269 ("The effect [of the
successorship rule] is to allow any new employer to determine for himself whether he will be bound
by the simple expedient of arranging for the termination of all of the prior employer's personnel.").
For more extended discussion of the successorship rules and their practical application, see gener-
ally, Wilbur Daniels & Seth Kupferberg, Sale of Assets, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Union View, in
LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note 105, at 185, 191-99; Marvin Dicker, Sale of Assets,
Mergers and Acquisitions: A Management View, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note
105, at 169-74; Samuel Estreicher, Successorship Obligations, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS
CHANGE, supra note 105, at 63; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Book Review: The Future of Collective
Bargaining: A Review Essay, 58 CINCINNATI L. REV. 477 (1989) [hereinafter Stone, Book Review]
158. Burns, 406 U.S. at 294, quoted in Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40.
159. Council Directive 77/187, art. 3 (1), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27. See BLANPAIN, supra note 42,
paras. 296, 309-10. States may elect to limit the duration of this requirement to one year after
completion of the transfer.
160. Council Directive 77/187, art. 3 (2), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at
158 296, 164-65 309-10.
161. Council Directive 77/187, art. 4 (1), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41,
paras. 313-15.
162. Council Directive 77/187, art. 6 (1), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27.
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ness as well as on terms and conditions of employment. 163
Moving to matters more clearly in the labor-management relations
sphere highlights the underlying differences between the European Com-
munity approach and the American system. The United States has a
labor-management relations system of all-or-nothing representation-
either the workforce has an exclusive collective bargaining agent or the
assumption is that individual workers deal directly, and individually,
with the employer. Efforts in non-union businesses to introduce less ad-
versarial forms of labor management cooperation raise the specter of
company-dominated unions, and pose grave legal issues under Section
8(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act.164
The European Community, in both its existing and proposed legisla-
tion, provides leeway for the diverse models of workplace democracy
that have grown up indigenously within its Member States. Collective
bargaining is usually conducted on an industry-wide or sector-wide basis,
either regionally or nationally, and tends to focus heavily on economic
issues. In several countries, shop floor level issues are handled, not
through the trade union/collective bargaining system, but through works
councils. In works council elections, all employees, whether union mem-
bers or not, are eligible to vote for representatives as "citizens" of the
enterprise. Unions often back slates of candidates, many of whom are
elected, but organizationally the works councils are entirely separate
from the trade union structure. Finally, in a few countries, there is an-
other layer of worker representation through election of workers to the
policy-making supervisory board of the corporation, or through worker
nomination of independent, but politically acceptable candidates, from
among whom the corporate supervisory board selects members.1 65
The EC directives take account of the fact that some member coun-
tries have only collective bargaining, some have collective bargaining and
works councils, and others provide for all three forms of worker partici-
pation in determining their terms and conditions of employment and the
future of the business for which they work. As noted previously, several
of the existing directives require Member States to legislatively provide
for information and consultation with workers' representatives, meaning
either their collective bargaining representative or works council, de-
pending on the labor relations system in the Member State. The direc-
163. Id. art. 1.
164. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (1992).
165. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 343-50; SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 115,
at 14; Docksey, supra note 149, at 35-39.
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tives addressing insolvency,1 66 redundancy, 67 and transfer of the
business 168 each impose such an obligation on the employer. In addition,
the health and safety framework directive imposes such an obligation,
hence all individual directives enacted pursuant thereto must also include
provision for participation by the workers' representatives. 69
This may be contrasted with unsuccessful efforts in the U.S. to enact
proposed federal legislation mandating joint labor-management health
and safety committees,170 and a bill providing for employee representa-
tives to be elected, along with employer representatives, to the boards
administering private pension plans covering the workers.' 7'
The EC has had under consideration for many years, but has failed
to enact, more far-reaching proposals in three areas: worker representa-
tion in corporate policy decision making processes in Member State cor-
porations; the creation of a European-chartered holding company for
multi-state enterprises with provisions for similar worker representation,
information and consultation rights concerning corporate policy; and the
creation of European-level works councils.
The Fifth Directive regarding the structure of nationally-chartered
public limited liability companies, would require Member States to
choose among four competing models regarding corporate-level worker
representation: (1) directly elected worker representatives on the corpo-
rate board of supervisors or other governing body with policy-making
authority and supervisory authority over the top corporate management
body; (2) selection of new members by the corporate supervisory board
from a list of independent (non-employee, non-trade unionist) candidates
nominated separately by shareholders, management and the employee
works council, with each of those three groups entitled, for cause, to veto
the selected nominee, subject to review and reversal by a court; (3) repre-
sentation through an enterprise level workers' council, or (4) representa-
tion through alternative systems agreed upon in a collective agreement
166. Council Directive, 80/987, art. 2 (1), 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23, as amended by Council Direc-
tive 87/164, 1987 O.J. (L 66) 1.
167. Council Directive 75/129, art. 1, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29.
168. Council Directive 77/187, arts. 3, 5, 6, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 2. See generally BLANPAIN, supra
note 41, paras. 316-318.
169. Council Directive 89/391, arts. 10, 11, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 5-6. See generally BLANPAIN,
supra note 41, paras. 272, 274-76, 279, 281.
170. H.R. 3160 § 201, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 1622 § 201, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
For a study addressing voluntarily-instituted joint labor-management occupational safety and health
committees, see RUTH RUTrENBERG, THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IN SAFE-
GUARDING WORKERS SAFETY AND HEALTH (1991).
171. H.R. 2664, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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between labor and management. 172 The supervisory organ in these cor-
porate structures has authority over all major forms of capital redeploy-
ment and organizational restructuring which have a substantial impact
on the nature, location and continued existence of employees' jobs. 73
Moreover, if the model selected is that of employee participation through
a worker representation body, that enterprise-level workers' council has
the right to information and consultation regarding the company's com-
petitive position, financial prospects, and investment plans, of the same
type provided to members of the corporate governance board. The work-
ers' council must also be consulted in the same sorts of major organiza-
tional changes that require supervisory board approval. If a collectively
bargained model is selected, the workers' representative is entitled to
rights similar to those of the worker representation body in the workers'
council model. ' 74 Member States are free, in enacting laws implementing
this directive, to limit the employer's choice of models to fewer than all
four.
These, of course, are precisely the sorts of decisions as to which
American courts and the NLRB have been most reluctant to mandate
collective bargaining, at least unless the decisions are based substantially
on labor factors. American legal scholars, although not the NLRB, have
raised doubts about the legality of experiments in participation of union
officials in corporate-level affairs through nomination to a seat on the
corporate board, 75 as well as other efforts at joint worker-management
decision making on matters of corporate policy.
There is also pending a proposed Council regulation and accompa-
nying directive which would establish a "European Company," that is, a
multi-national holding corporation, operating in several EC Member
States, chartered by the EC, and operating within an EC-established cor-
172. 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2. A detailed discussion may be found in BLANPAIN, supra note 41,
paras. 338-350.
173. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 340-42.
174. See id. paras. 346-47.
175. Helen S. Scott, Union Directors and Fiduciary Duties under State Corporate Law, in LABOR
LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note 105, at 115 (questioning lawfulness under state corporate
fiduciary duty law); Brian Hamer, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards
of Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639 (1981); Bennett Abramowitz, Broadening the Board: Labor
Participation in Corporate Governance, 34 Sw. L.J. 963 (1980); Stone, Labor and the Corporate Struc-
ture, supra note 157, at 126-31, 147-51 (examining doctrine disqualifying union as bargaining agent
based on conflict of interest because its official holds seat on company's or competitor's board of
directors).
Despite its earlier opposition to union representation on corporate boards, the NLRB General
Counsel declined to issue a complaint regarding the seat on the Chrysler board of directors provided
to then UAW President Douglas A. Fraser. See Douglas A. Fraser, Worker Participation in Corpo-
rate Government: The UA. W.-Chrysler Experience, 58 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 949 (1982).
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porate law framework, avoiding the problems of conflicting national cor-
porate laws. The regulation requires that the management of "each of
the founder companies shall discuss with its workers' representatives the
legal, economic and employment implications of the formation of the
Societas Europaea (SE) or European Company for the employees and
any measures proposed to deal with them."' 76 Moreover, once the SE
has been established, it must provide for employee participation by
choosing a system of workers' participation, with roughly the same four
models, sketched out above in connection with the Fifth Directive, to
choose from.177 In transposing the SE directive into their own national
legislation, Member States are free to restrict the choices of companies
with registered offices in their state to fewer than all four options; conse-
quently, the site of the registered office of the SE will determine how
many of the four choices for worker participation are in fact available. 178
Involvement of the workers is specifically defined in the directive to mean
their participation "in the supervision and strategic development" of the
SE.' 79 Even the choice of model for employee participation must be
agreed upon between founding companies' management boards and the
workers' representatives.180
The proposed directive on European works councils is designed to
ensure that large companies that operate on a multi-Member State scale
engage in information and consultation with worker representatives re-
garding matters beyond the scope of local level management. It would
provide for the creation of a multistate workers' representative partner to
deal with EC-level management. The scope of the proposed information
and consultation rights is extensive, including information regarding
probable development of business, prospects for the immediate future,
the employment situation, probable trends in the industry and for the
company. The European works council, in turn, is to pass information
back to local level works councils. Any corporate restructuring proposal
likely to have serious consequences for employees would have to be the
176. Proposed Council Regulation, art. 33, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41, 48. See BLANPAIN, supra note
41, para. 354.
177. Proposed Council Directive, art. 3 (3), (4)-(6), 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69, 69-70. See Proposed
Council Regulation, arts. 63 para. 2, 66 para. 3, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41, 54. See BLANPAIN, supra note
41, paras. 354-55. The model for a workers' council is somewhat different and depends on the
practices within the Member States. See id. para. 356.
178. Proposed Council Directive, art. 3 (4), (5), 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69, 70. See BLANPAIN, supra
note 41, para. 355.
179. Proposed Council Directive, art. 2, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41,
para. 355.
180. Proposed Council Directive, art. 3 (1), 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41,
para. 357.
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subject of advance information and consultation, although the final deci-
sion rests with management.18'
These three proposals regarding worker participation in multistate
employers' strategic decision making evidence the EC's commitment to
retain and even increase legal requirements for meaningful worker partic-
ipation, as well as the Community's concern about the accelerated pace
of capital redeployment. The prospects for passage of the European
works council directive are generally regarded as the brightest among the
three. The 1992 amendment to the collective redundancies directive, en-
suring its applicability to transnational decision making, is even stronger
evidence on this point. 8 2
Beyond the far broader scope of worker representation and consul-
tation regarding the operations of the enterprise contemplated by these
proposals, lie important and fundamental differences between how most
Americans view labor-management relations and how many Europeans
do. The very words "Social Partners," appearing throughout EC Treaty
law, assume mutual interdependence of management and labor, and mu-
tual recognition of that interdependence. Contrast this with the view of
the U.S. Supreme Court in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,8 3
that Congress, in enacting the NLRA, "had no expectation that the
elected union representative would become an equal partner in the run-
ning of the business enterprise .... ,,184 Therefore, the Court reasoned,
bargaining should not be mandatory over decisions directly affecting em-
ployees' jobs, but motivated by concerns entirely apart from labor fac-
tors. There is an enormous gap between European and American
perspectives on this point.
The proposed employee participation directives pale in significance
compared to the role of the "social partners" within the European gov-
ernance scheme itself. In the United States, traditionally both manage-
ment and labor are suspicious of government, and vice versa. Only in
limited circumstances has this country accepted tripartite, labor-manage-
ment-government solutions to problems.
In the EC, on the other hand, the idea of tripartitism is widely ac-
cepted, and coming into full flower. Under European Community law,
181. Proposed Counsel Directive, 1991 O.J. (C 39) 10, as amended by 1991 O.J. (C 336) 11.
However, if no agreement can be reached, the management board may unilaterally select the model
for worker participation in corporate governance. Id. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, pa-
ras. 362-78.
182. Council Directive 92/56, 1992 O.J. (L 245) 4 (amending Council Directive 75/129 1975,
O.J. (L 48) 29).
183. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
184. Id. at 676.
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both prior to, as well as after Maastricht, labor and management were
represented, along with other social segments such as farmers, on the
Economic and Social Committee, an EC governmental institution with
which consultation by other branches of government is mandated before
certain types of legislation are enacted.185 In addition, the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1986 added to the EEC Treaty, Article 118B, which called
upon the Commission to promote "the social dialogue," meaning EC-
level discussions between EC-level bodies representing respectively man-
agement and labor. The social dialogue in 199 1, in turn, produced a joint
proposal which evolved into the Agreement on Social Policy adopted by
eleven Member States at Maastricht. 86 Internal changes now in pro-
gress within the Europe-wide employers' and unions' organizations will
facilitate EC-level joint actions by labor and management.
Under the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to the Maastricht
Treaty, the role of the social partners is expanded to the point where they
potentially may operate as legislators, or in lieu of legislators. First, as to
any directive adopted under the procedures of the Agreement on Social
Policy, any Member State may "entrust management and labour, at their
joint request, with the implementation," provided they accomplish an
agreement within the time limits imposed by the EC directive.18 7 That
is, the Member State may fulfill its treaty obligation to enact national
implementing legislation to accomplish the purpose of the directive by
delegating this function to national, regional or sectoral collective bar-
gaining. The Member State must have in place or adopt legislation to
make the results of the labor-management agreement binding on all em-
ployers and workers, and not merely those represented, or the Member
State may enact supplementary legislation to implement the directive as
to workers otherwise left out of the scope of coverage' 88
Second, in fulfilling its obligation to "promot[e] the consultation of
management and labour at Community level and . . . to facilitate their
dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties,"' 8 9 the Commis-
sion, "before submitting proposals in the social policy field, shall consult
management and labour on the direction" of action it is proposing. 90 If
it proceeds with action, the Commission is to consult the social partners
on the content of the proposal. The social partners may render an opin-
185. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 38.
186. The text of the UNICE, the ETUC, and CEEP joint Proposal of the draft Treaty for Euro-
pean Political Union may be found as Annex 1I to BLANPAIN, supra note 2, at 80-81.
187. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2 (4).
188. Id.
189. Id. art. 3 (1).
190. Id. art. 3 (2).
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ion or recommendation on the Commission's proposed directive. 19'
Thereafter, the usual legislative process is followed by the Council.
In lieu of rendering an opinion leading to possible legislation, how-
ever, the social partners may invoke the Article 4 process of attempting,
for up to nine months, to reach an EC collective agreement covering the
matter. 92 Such an agreement may then be presented to the Council for
its adoption, which renders the contents binding EC law. Alternatively,
the social partners may have their collective agreement implemented
through the national-level procedures, either through legislative transpo-
sition at the Member State level, or through national-level collective
bargaining. 193
In effect, the Social Agreement recognizes the social partners as a
branch of government, delegating to them partial legislative powers. The
idea that as to labor-management issues, employer councils and unions
or workers' councils are more democratically representative of the con-
cerned parties-and better situated than governmental actors to enact
regulation governing the employment relationship---is one alien to the
American governmental process, despite the lip service paid to minimiz-
ing governmental intrusion into labor matters. The EC concept of "sub-
sidiarity" is being interpreted to delegate regulatory authority as to
conditions of employment to the social partners, as the most appropriate
decision-maker, rather than to Member States or regional governmental
bodies.
A final, dramatic difference, related to the social partnership notion,
is the EC's commitment to social cohesion. A useful comparison is the
American Equal Pay Act, which was designed to eliminate discrimina-
tion without injuring male workers. The statute provides that denials of
equal pay on the basis of sex may only be remedied by raising women's
wages to the level of men's, never by lowering the men to the women's
level, nor by equalizing somewhere in the middle.' 94
In attempting to equalize disparate standards of living, wages, hours
and working conditions among the EC Member States, the Community
has always operated on this principle, attempting to harmonize upwards,
to the extent possible. In Article 117 of the original Treaty of Rome, in
language carried forward unaltered to the present EC Treaty, the Mem-
ber States agree "to promote improvement of the living and working con-
ditions of labor so as to permit the equalization of such conditions in an
191. Id. art. 3 (3).
192. Id. art. 3 (4).
193. Id. art. 4 (2).
194. See § 3(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
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upward direction. 9 5 The Member States rely on more than the market
forces of a single unified market to achieve "harmonization of social sys-
tems, but also [on] the procedures provided for under this Treaty and...
the approximation of legislative and administrative provisions."' 96 The
EC provides for a series of "social cohesion" funds intended to help un-
derdeveloped Member States and regions catch up with the standards of
the rest of the Community. In devising social policy, the EC approach is
to avoid mandating such high standards that the competitive labor ad-
vantage of the lower labor cost states is entirely eliminated, while ensur-
ing a gradual improvement in their labor standards to the level of the
Community norm. There have always been those who advocated accom-
plishing convergence of Member States' living and working standards
through market forces alone, but they have consistently compromised
with those advocating the use of EC legislation to limit the damage to
Member States with higher standards. This ensures continued commit-
ment to the Community, while gradually raising the level of those at the
bottom.
The Community is committed to avoiding what they call "social
dumping." In the United States, the analogous North-South migration
of plants and competition between states for the least common denomi-
nator in labor standards, hence labor costs, has been labelled the "race to
the bottom." As the United States government attempts to build a com-
mon market with Canada and Mexico, it is content, by and large, to let
market forces have their way, predictably leading to convergence of liv-
ing standards and working conditions somewhere below the present level
in both Canada and the United States. No combined governance struc-
ture of any substantial sort was originally contemplated by the treaty
negotiators, except one directly focused on trade disputes. 197
At the same time, the European Community is expanding to incor-
porate EFTA countries, and, eventually, some of the central European
states, maintaining its efforts at social cohesion through managed, rather
than purely market-driven forces. The Community has recognized that
creating a common market, without common representative governance
structures and common social policy, dooms efforts at managed conver-
gence of living and labor standards to failure, leaving them at the mercy
of market forces. The Agreement on Social Policy is a response to that
195. TREATY OF ROME, art. 117; EC Treaty, art. 117.
196. TREATY OF ROME, art. 117; EC Treaty, art. 117.
197. The Clinton administration, however, may have other ideas, as it has announced plans to
negotiate a North-America-wide procedure for enforcing at least some aspects of proposed side
agreements to NAFTA addressing environmental and labor standards.
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recognition, as is the EC's effort to chart out a path for full membership,
with democratic participation rights in Community decisions, for coun-
tries now bound to the results of EC decisions as part of its single market
under association agreements, but lacking full input into the EC legisla-
tive process. The United States could learn a great deal from studying
the European Community example.

